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ARTICLES
THE DOMAIN OF TORTS
Alex Stein*
This Article advances a novel positive theory of tort law. The
Article’s core insight is that the benefit from the harm-causing activity
determines the form and substance of tort liability. This finding is
surprising and innovative, since tort scholars universally believe that
the doctrines determining individuals’ liability for accidents—negli-
gence, causation, and damage—are driven by harms, not benefits.
Specifically, the Article shows that our tort system operates in two
modes—private and public—rather than one, as conventional accounts
erroneously suggest. The mode and the rules allocating liability for
accidents are determined by the type of benefit sought by the alleged
tortfeasor. If the benefit is purely private, the tortfeasor will be liable for
the harm whenever she exposes the victim to a nonreciprocal risk, no
matter how significant that private benefit is relative to the harm. By
excluding cost-benefit analysis and favoring reciprocity and equality
principles, the system discourages the production of private benefits even
when they are economically more valuable than the victim’s safety. When
the benefit accompanying the harm-causing activity is public, however,
tort law adopts a strictly utilitarian approach and focuses on mini-
mizing the sum of costs of accidents and costs of accident prevention.
Liability thus is imposed based on the famous Learned Hand formula
(and similar formulations): No liability will be imposed if the benefit
from the activity is greater than the expected harm and precautions are
too costly.
This insight has far-reaching implications. Scholars interpret the
tort system’s goal as promoting fairness and corrective justice or,
alternatively, economic efficiency, but not both. The Article demonstrates
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that this dichotomous view is fundamentally mistaken. The case law
reveals that our tort system promotes fairness and corrective justice only
when it operates in the private mode, but when the system switches to the
public mode, it balances victims’ safety against the production of public
benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he general rules . . . that I must so use my real estate as not to injure
my neighbor[] are much modified by the exigencies of the social state.
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They
are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis
of all our civilization. If I have any of these upon my lands, and they
are not a nuisance and are not so managed as to become such, I am not
responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my
neighbor. He receives his compensation for such damage by the general
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good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place the same
things upon his lands.1
[F]or more than 150 years courts have recognized that a defendant
breaches no duty of care merely by operating socially beneficial machinery
in a manner that is regular and necessary, even if . . . some injury or
damage ensues.2
This Article unfolds a novel descriptive account of the goals, scope,
structure, and conceptual foundations of our system of torts. To de-
marcate the core area governed by this system, the Article develops a
distinction between three basic types of human interactions: (1) mutually
wanted, (2) coercive, and (3) mutually unwanted. Our tort system prima-
rily regulates accidents as mutually unwanted interactions that result in
harm to one of the parties. Mutually wanted and coercive interactions are
governed, respectively, by contract law and criminal law.3 They give rise to
tort liability only in special cases that occupy the interface between torts,
contracts, and crimes. These special cases have a common characteristic:
Their transfer into the domain of torts correlates with the public interest
in regulating the underlying interaction.4 For mutually wanted interac-
tions, conceptualized as contracts, an increase in the public interest
triggers the imposition of tort liability whenever the interaction causes
damage to one of the parties.5 For coercive interactions identified as
crimes, a decline in the public interest prompts policymakers to substi-
tute harsh criminal penalties for the compensatory remedy of the law of
torts.6
The Article’s distinction between these three basic types of human
interactions does more than map out the interplay between torts, con-
tracts, and crimes. It also plays a critical role in understanding the tort
system’s internal mechanisms that allocate individuals’ responsibility for
accidental harm.
Accidents, identified here as mutually unwanted interactions, have a
unique risk-benefit structure that separates them from coercive and
mutually wanted interactions. Mutually wanted and coercive interactions
1. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–85 (1873) (Earl, C.J.).
2. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1997).
3. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (formulating contract law’s goal as helping “contracting
parties to maximize the joint gains . . . from transactions”); Alex Stein, Corrupt Intentions:
Bribery, Unlawful Gratuity, and Honest-Services Fraud, 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 61, 61
(2012) [hereinafter Stein, Corrupt Intentions] (rationalizing criminal law as a system that
prohibits and punishes actions that apply force or fraud against nonconsenting victims).
4. See infra section V.B.2 (showing whether certain interaction is subject to regu-
lation depends on the level of public interest).
5. See infra notes 475–479 and accompanying text (examining how tort liability
interplays with contract law).
6. See infra notes 472–474 and accompanying text.
538 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:535
have one thing in common: They embody the full amount of the parties’
costs and benefits (perverse and legitimate). Mutually unwanted inter-
actions, on the other hand, reflect only the actors’ costs, but not the
benefits. The reason is this: Mutually unwanted interactions never take place
as standalones. Rather, they are by-products of other uncoordinated
activities that promote the actors’ and society’s benefits while creating an
unwanted risk of accidental harm. The socially optimal volume of
accidents—unlike that of coercive interactions identified as crimes—
therefore cannot be zero. Nor can it be one hundred percent, as is the
case with mutually wanted interactions identified as contracts. Banning
every accident-prone activity would suppress the benefits that those
activities generate. Conversely, allowing actors to carry out any accident-
prone activity and get off scot-free would create more harm than good
because then self-seeking actors would indiscriminately put other people
in harm’s way.7 The tort system consequently must develop and imple-
ment socially beneficial trade-offs between different benefits and risks of
accident. As the rest of the Article demonstrates, the system implements
those trade-offs by formulating multiple rules that determine legal
consequences for actors’ unwanted interactions.
These rules form the central core of our system of torts. They deter-
mine the actor’s fault, predominantly conceptualized as negligence, and
consequent responsibility for the accident.8 They also provide criteria for
identifying the victim’s damage and for determining the causal nexus
between the negligence and the harm.9 Courts and scholars have formed
no consensus as to what those rules say and purport to achieve. Instead,
they have developed different and potentially conflicting interpretations
of “negligence,” “damage,” and “causation” that coalesce around two big
ideas about our tort system’s goals.10
7. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1883 (1991) (explaining limitations on
liability for tort damages encourage actors and firms to externalize risk of harm).
8. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, at 23 (5th
ed. 1984) (underscoring the central role fault plays in the American tort system); Robert
L. Rabin, Perspectives on Tort Law 1 (4th ed. 1995) (same); see also Stephen R. Perry, The
Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 Canadian J.L. & Juris. 147, 147–48, 161–68
(1988) (showing fault-free liability for damages is unworkable).
9. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 1, at 4.
10. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 Stan. L.
Rev. 67, 67 (2010) (describing leading tort theories as creating a fairness–efficiency
divide); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort
Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 187, 189–91 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Concept of Corrective
Justice] (juxtaposing deterrence against corrective justice explanations of our tort system);
Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1801 (1997) (noting some scholars perceive the tort system as
geared toward optimal deterrence while others interpret it as geared toward corrective
justice); Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623–
25 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Deterrence] (discussing the fairness–efficiency divide).
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One of those ideas holds that the tort system promotes fairness and
corrective justice.11 To attain this moral goal, the system sets up a bilateral
framework of safety-related rights and duties. This framework grants
safety rights to potential victims of accidents and imposes correlative
duties to take precautions upon actors whose conduct might accidentally
harm other people.12 By setting up this framework, the system creates an
equilibrium of equality and reciprocity between actors and their pros-
pective victims. An actor has a duty to respect this equilibrium whenever
she acts in a way that puts another person in harm’s way or undertakes,
expressly or implicitly, to protect another person against harm.13 An actor
disrupts the equilibrium and consequently acts “negligently” when she
imposes a disproportionate and hence nonreciprocal risk of harm on
another person.14 The risk created by the actor is considered nonreci-
procal—and therefore wrongful—when it is manifestly more severe than
the ordinary and commonly expected risks of harm to which people
expose one another in their daily affairs.15 When a nonreciprocal and
wrongful risk, for which the actor is responsible, results in an accident that
causes the victim physical injury, property damage, or other recognized
harm, the actor becomes obligated to compensate the victim for her
damage.16 The compensation amount that the actor would have to pay
the victim must provide the victim with an adequate monetary substitute
for her deprivation.17 By compensating the victim, the wrongdoer is
deemed to have righted the wrong.18
Another school of thought views the tort system from a completely
different angle, according to which the system is designed to minimize
the total sum of the costs of accidents and the costs associated with
accident prevention, private and social.19 To accomplish this economic
11. Major works that promote and articulate this idea include: Jules L. Coleman,
Risks and Wrongs 209 (1992) [hereinafter Coleman, Risks and Wrongs]; Ernest J. Weinrib,
Corrective Justice 9 (2012) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice]; George P. Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 538–39 (1972); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 918–19 (2010);
Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249, 250–51 (1996);
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
311, 312–13 (1996); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa L. Rev.
449, 449–50 (1992); Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, in Philosophical
Foundations of Tort Law 159, 182 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
12. See Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 11, at 44–45 (explicating the right–
duty–remedy mechanism of corrective justice).
13. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 31, at 169, § 56, at 375, 378–82.
14. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 540–44.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 550–51.
18. See id. at 551.
19. Major works affiliated with this school of thought include: Guido Calabresi, The
Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 26, 30 (1970) [hereinafter Calabresi,
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goal, the system requires actors whose conduct creates a risk of harm to
another person to take every precaution that costs less than the expected
harm it prevents.20
Correspondingly, the system defines faulty conduct or “negligence”
as the actor’s failure to reduce the expected harm to the victim—measured
by the cost of the harm multiplied by the harm’s probability—by taking
precautions that are cheaper than the expected harm.21 To incentivize
actors to take the requisite precautions and avoid chilling socially bene-
ficial conduct, the system applies special rules of causation and damage.
These rules align actors’ expected compensation payouts with the socially
desirable amount. When the expected payout discourages actors from
carrying out a socially beneficial activity, the rules reduce the payout and
sometimes grant actors absolute immunity against liability in tort.22
Conversely, when the tort system anticipates underenforcement of the
requisite safety standard on account of scarce resources (or for any other
reason), it lowers the causation requirements for plaintiffs and makes
negligent actors pay more than the damage they cause.23
For the vast majority of tort scholars and practitioners, the fairness–
efficiency divide is the most important unresolved issue in tort theory.24
Both sides to this debate view the two interpretations of our tort system
as fundamentally incompatible with each other.25 Against this under-
standing, this Article argues that the incompatibility view is accurate only
as a characterization of unrealistically one-sided normative theories that
use fairness or, alternatively, efficiency as the sole criterion for allocating
risks of accident. As a descriptive matter, the incompatibility view misses
Costs of Accidents]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Tort Law 4–9 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 191–251 (9th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis of Law]; Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis of Law 175–285 (2004); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1057–59 (1972); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive
Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale L.J. 799, 799–801, 814–20 (1983); see also Robert
L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 Ga. L.
Rev. 925, 930–31 (1981) (arguing the communitarian explanation of liability for accidents
aligns with efficiency).
20. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 192–93.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 369–386, 417–424 and accompanying text (discussing limitations
and statutory caps on tort compensation in medical malpractice cases).
23. See infra notes 301–343 and accompanying text (citing and discussing cases
illustrating causation rules).
24. See supra note 10 (listing major scholarly works that represent both sides of the
fairness–efficiency divide).
25. See, e.g., Hershovitz, supra note 10, at 68; Posner, Concept of Corrective Justice,
supra note 10, at 201–06 (offering an economic explanation for corrective justice);
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1828 (suggesting a mixed theory of tort law “assessing neg-
ligence law as a practice which, at stage one, seeks to deter negligence generally,” and “at
stage two, acknowledges the incomplete success of its stage-one effort and accordingly
recognizes the corrective justice rights of those . . . victimized by negligence”).
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the target completely: It fails to give a proper description of how our tort
system actually works.
Scholars who hold the incompatibility view make an implicit assump-
tion that accidents have a uniform risk-benefit structure that should
determine whether tortfeasors should be tolerated or penalized. This
assumption, however, is fundamentally flawed. Accidents have a dual,
rather than uniform, risk-benefit structure. All accident-prone activities
generate benefits, but those benefits are not equal. Some of them are
fully consumed by the actor who generates them while creating the risk
of harm for another person. Other benefits go to the society at large as
well. Benefits falling into the first category are private. Benefits falling
into the second category are public.
This distinction has hitherto not received the scholarly attention it
deserves. Yet, it is critical for understanding our tort system. As this
Article will demonstrate, this system uses two different sets of rules, as
opposed to one, to regulate accidents. Accidents incidental to conduct
that generates purely private benefits are regulated by the rules of neg-
ligence, causation, and damage that promote fairness and corrective
justice.26 Accidents incidental to activities that produce public benefits
(alongside the actor’s private gain) are regulated by the rules of negli-
gence, causation, and damage that promote social welfare.27 The fairness–
efficiency divide that exists in our tort system is therefore superficial.
Whether a court deciding a tort case should apply the welfare-oriented
rather than the fairness-based set of rules, or vice versa, depends on the
private or public categorization of the benefit generated by the actor’s
risky activity.28 Conceptually, the fairness-based set of rules belongs to
private law and the welfare-oriented set affiliates with public law. The two
sets of rules thus do not contradict one another. Rather, they implement
different regulatory mechanisms—private and public—and apply to
different kinds of accidents.29
Consider the following scenario. Arnold brings an inflatable bouncy
house to his backyard in preparation for his daughter’s sixth birthday
party.30 The house goes airborne, lands on Victoria’s porch, and causes
property damage in the amount of $2,000. Such accidents occur very
26. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (identifying corrective justice as the
goal in regulating activities that generate private benefits).
27. See infra notes 101–102 and accompanying text (identifying social welfare as the
goal in regulating activities that generate public benefits).
28. See infra section I.B (identifying and outlining the “benefit principle”).
29. Cf. Weinrib, Deterrence, supra note 10, at 626–28, 639 (arguing that corrective
justice, as a system of correlating rights and wrongs, is incompatible with deterrence while
acknowledging that deterrence can “further[] corrective justice while leaving it intact”).
30. See, e.g., Inflatables from Windy City Popcorn, Windy City Popcorn Party Rentals,
http://www.windycitypopcorn.com/inflatables.php [http://perma.cc/C8ST-XDX5] (last
visited Nov. 1, 2016) (advertising inflatables).
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rarely, say, in one out of one hundred cases. Damage sustained by Victoria
is typical for this type of accident. The fun and excitement that the bouncy
house was supposed to bring to Arnold’s party therefore vastly exceed
Victoria’s expected harm ($20). Unimpressed by this fact, Victoria takes
Arnold to court.
Under the fairness-based rules, the court will have to determine
whether the risk of harm to which Arnold exposed Victoria was reciprocal.
This determination will depend on whether inflatables are commonplace
and acceptable in Arnold and Victoria’s residential community. If they
are, the court will not hold Arnold responsible for Victoria’s damage. If
they are not, the court will determine that Arnold imposed on Victoria a
nonreciprocal risk of damage and order him to pay her $2,000.31
The welfare-oriented approach, on the other hand, would grant
Arnold a flat exemption from liability for Victoria’s damage if his activity
brought the total cost of damage and damage avoidance to the mini-
mum. Our tort system, however, will tell the court not to apply this
approach in Victoria v. Arnold. The system will do so because the categorical
welfare-oriented approach is problematic in one fundamental respect: It
treats Arnold’s private benefit from the bouncy house as an economic
twin of a public benefit. The two benefits, however, are not economic
twins nor even distant cousins. The fun and excitement that the bouncy
house brings to Arnold’s backyard confer no benefits on the society at
large. Letting Arnold go scot-free would consequently put his private
enjoyment ahead of Victoria’s safety. This prioritization would violate the
equality equilibrium between Arnold and Victoria even when Arnold’s
precautions against accident cost more than Victoria’s expected damage.
When it comes to risky activities that generate public benefits, our
tort system takes a different path: It switches from corrective justice to
welfare and becomes unwilling to immunize victims’ safety interest
against utilitarian trade-offs.32 Consider the following set of facts: “During
the mad scramble that usually follows hard upon an airplane’s arrival at
the gate, a briefcase fell from an overhead compartment and seriously
injured [the] plaintiff.”33 In this case, the victim’s injury originates from
the risk incidental to an activity that produces public benefit: fast
transportation and mobility of people and goods. The air carrier could
minimize this risk only by reducing the benefit. For example, it could
31. Victoria’s suit can proceed under both negligence and a private nuisance theory.
See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 88, at 629–30. For a classic account, see William L.
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 406–07 (1942) (showing “extraordi-
nary” risky activities trigger liability and contrasting them with a “‘natural’ condition or
activity” that “is sanctioned by the needs and customs of the community, so that it is not
required to pay its way in terms of resulting damage”).
32. See infra section I.B (identifying and explaining the switch from corrective justice
to welfare according to the “benefit principle”).
33. Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc., 24 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994).
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retrofit the overhead compartments in its airplanes, but then it would
have to ground those airplanes and cancel flights, or, alternatively, create
congestions in air traffic.
A court’s attempt to decide this case by applying the private mecha-
nism of accident regulation and its equality and reciprocity standards
would be futile. As an initial matter, the disparity in power and opera-
tions between air carriers and passengers makes it difficult to set up a
metric for comparing the risks of damage to which they mutually expose
each other and for estimating whether these risks are disproportionate,
and hence wrongful, or routine and reciprocal, and hence justified.
Second, because the plaintiff benefits from air transportation, she has no
plausible claim for an entitlement that would put her safety ahead of
other passengers’ convenience or give her safety a protection that reduces
the quality of air transportation for all people who use airplanes. More
fundamentally, under our system—and, indeed, under any plausible vision
of political morality—a person’s demand for safety that comes at the
expense of other people’s well-being has no a priori validity.34 For all
these reasons, whether the air carrier’s failure to retrofit overhead com-
partments in its airplanes constituted negligence can be determined only
by a cost-benefit analysis. The public mechanism of accident regulation
consequently takes over this type of tort case.
The two mechanisms of accident regulation—private and public—
do not only employ different concepts of “negligence.” Their “damage”
and “causation” concepts also differ from one another. The private
mechanism uses these concepts to create a match between the victim’s
safety entitlement, the entitlement’s violation by the actor, and the
compensation that the actor must pay the victim.35 The public mechanism,
on the other hand, takes an unqualifiedly instrumental view on both
“causation” and “damage.”36 When a victim’s damage is causally uncer-
tain, the public mechanism makes it easier for her to prove causation in
order to ensure that negligent actors do not get off scot-free and remain
undeterred.37 Conversely, when tort liability threatens to chill the
production of a public benefit, the mechanism reduces the amount of
34. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 60 (1971) (“[E]ach person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others. . . . [S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are . . .
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage . . . .”).
35. See Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 11, at 44–45, 87–97 (explaining the
correlativity of rights, duties, and remedies under corrective justice).
36. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 229 (“If the purpose of tort law is to
promote economic efficiency, a defendant’s conduct will be deemed the cause of an injury
when making him liable for the consequences of the injury will promote an efficient
allocation of resources to safety and care.”).
37. See infra notes 301–343 and accompanying text (outlining and explaining victim-
friendly causation rules with case examples).
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compensation that actors pay their victims.38 Courts applying the public
mechanism obligate negligent actors to compensate victims in the amount
that creates optimal deterrence. Negligent actors never pay compen-
sation below or above that amount. Their payouts incentivize conduct
that minimizes the total sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
preventing accidents.39
The public mechanism of accident regulation promotes an addi-
tional economic goal: reduction of the costs of adjudication. To that end,
the public mechanism employs formal rules that define actors’ negli-
gence and causal responsibility for victims’ harm in a way that allows
courts to streamline their proceedings and decisions on tort liability.40
Rules that perform this function realize economies of scale not available
under the private mechanism.41 The private mechanism generates no
such economies because it is geared toward attaining corrective justice
between individual actors inter se.42 This mechanism sets up a framework
of safety rights, the matching duties to take precautions, and the violator’s
obligation to pay the victim the amount of money that makes good her
damage.43 The tort system’s economies are not allowed to change any-
thing in that bilateral framework of rights and duties. If they do, the
private mechanism would become public and no longer deliver corrective
justice.44
The conventional view of the tort system as consisting of three
pillars—negligence, causation, and damage—is therefore descriptively
inaccurate. This view is accurate only in a narrow semantic sense, but not
substantively.45 As far as substance is concerned, each of the three pillars
has an independent meaning that can be private or public, depending
on the mechanism to which it belongs and that mechanism’s goal. As this
38. See infra section IV.B (describing caps on tort victims’ damages and the abolition
of the “collateral source” rule).
39. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 229 (explaining welfare-driven adjust-
ments of tortfeasors’ scope of liability).
40. See generally James A. Henderson Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 Cornell L.
Rev. 901 (1982) (explaining the connection between substantive tort rules and costs of
adjudication).
41. See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 423, 432–39 (2015) (explaining
how legal systems realize economies of scale through evidentiary rules and providing
examples from the torts area).
42. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (describing the private mechanism
of accident regulation).
43. See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (explaining how the private
mechanism operates).
44. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 5 (1995) [hereinafter Weinrib,
Private Law] (disavowing functionalism and underscoring “the purpose of private law is to
be private law”).
45. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the
Common Law, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1241, 1255–62 (2015) (distinguishing between “jural”
and “normative” meanings of legal concepts).
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Article will explain, the private mechanism of accident regulation inter-
prets negligence, causation, and damage in terms of the victim’s entitle-
ment to protection against disproportionate, or nonreciprocal, risks of
harm and the actor’s correlative duty to avoid or mitigate those risks. The
public mechanism interprets these pillars of liability through the lens of
efficiency analysis that relies on economics and statistical information.
Mapping of the domain of torts does not stop here. The analytical
scheme developed here helps to uncover the “doctrinal migrations”: a
cross-field dynamic that shapes the contours of our tort system. This
dynamic is important, but scholars and policymakers have not given it
the attention it deserves.
Oftentimes, public regulation of accidents utilizes specialized know-
ledge and safety standards of the relevant industry. When such regulation
gets to define negligence, causation, and damage, it merges the tort
system with—and, in some cases, replaces it by—regulatory law. Thus far,
our tort system has experienced three big mergers or partial migrations:
the merger of medical malpractice laws and health law; the merger of
products liability, federal regulation, and consumer protection laws; and
the merger of workplace accident laws and labor law.46 Similar to the
migration of liability across the lines separating torts from contracts and
crimes, these mergers are driven by public interest. An increase in the
public interest in regulating a particular type of accident moves that type
of accidents away from the law of torts and toward regulatory law.
This Article’s descriptive theory of the law of torts unfolds in five
parts. Part I lays the analytical foundations for the theory. Parts II, III,
and IV show how the doctrines of negligence, causation, and damage,
respectively, operate under both private and public regulation of accidents.
Part V identifies, illustrates, and explains the migration and merger
phenomenon.
I. GROUNDWORK
This Part lays the foundations for the positive account of tort law set
forth in Parts II, III, IV, and V. Section I.A analyzes the unique risk-
benefit structure of accidents, as contrasted with mutually wanted and
coercive interactions regulated, respectively, by contract law and criminal
law. Unlike mutually wanted and coercive interactions that embody the
full amount of the parties’ costs and benefits, accidents encompass only
the parties’ costs, but not the benefits. As demonstrated below, accidents
are not standalones. Rather, they are unwanted by-products of the
parties’ uncoordinated activities that aim at producing benefits while also
creating a risk of harm. The socially desirable volume of accident-prone
activities consequently depends on their benefits and whether those
46. See infra section V.B.1.
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benefits offset the expected harm. Those benefits are not normative
equals. Rather, they fall into two separate categories: private and public.
Benefits fully consumed by the actor who generates them are private,
while benefits that go to society as well are public.
Based on this analysis, section I.B singles out the “benefit principle”
as a key organizing principle of the law of torts. As demonstrated in
section I.B, this principle explains the bi-modal regulatory regime set by
our tort system for activities causing accidental harm. When the benefit
from the accident-causing activity is private, the system applies rules that
promote fairness and corrective justice. These rules protect victims
against nonreciprocal imposition of the risk of harm while refusing to
prioritize the actor’s private benefit, no matter how valuable it is econo-
mically, over the victim’s safety interest. When the benefit arising from
the accident-causing activity is public, the system switches to an efficiency
mode and applies rules that minimize the overall costs of accidents. Under
this mode, actors who produce public benefits are allowed to expose
other people to a risk of harm when the value of the benefit exceeds the
expected harm to the victim.
Section I.C outlines these two modes of the tort system’s operation,
identified, respectively, as the private and the public mechanisms of
accident regulation. Specifically, it reveals that the three core doctrines of
tort liability—negligence, causation, and damage—operate differently
under those mechanisms.
A. The Anatomy of Accidents
Humans interact with each other cooperatively, coercively, and
accidentally. These interactions form three distinct legal categories:
contracts, crimes, and torts. Contract law regulates interactions that are
mutually wanted.47 Criminal law regulates interactions wanted by one
party (the perpetrator acting by force or fraud) and unwanted by
another (the victim).48 Tort law, in turn, regulates interactions that are
mutually unwanted: It allocates the financial responsibility for physical,
proprietary, emotional, and economic harms that parties to such inter-
actions accidentally endure.49 At its margins, the law of torts regulates
both coercive and mutually wanted interactions. Specifically, it makes
actors financially responsible for harms they intentionally inflict upon
other people,50 and it also tells which contractual allocations of people’s
47. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 95.
48. See id. at 253 (conceptualizing criminal conduct as coercive transfer).
49. See Shavell, supra note 19, at 175 (describing the law of torts as accident law).
50. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 253 (analogizing inten-
tional torts to crimes because they “represent a pure coercive transfer either of wealth or
of utility from victim to wrongdoer”); infra notes 469–471 and accompanying text (obser-
ving intentional torts stem from criminal law).
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responsibility for accidents will and will not be recognized as valid and
enforceable.51 The focal point of our tort system, however, is accidents
that originate from people’s mutually unwanted interactions. The distinct
and by far most important, as well as most complicated, components of
our tort system regulate accidental harms.52
This insight provides the key to understanding our system of torts.
Mutually unwanted interactions, or accidents, have a unique structure
that sets them apart from coercive and mutually wanted interactions.
Mutually wanted and coercive interactions encompass all of the parties’
costs and benefits (perverse and legitimate). Mutually unwanted inter-
actions, on the other hand, embody only the actors’ costs, but not the
benefits. The reason is this: Mutually unwanted interactions result from
other activities that actors independently carry out to their benefit. More
precisely, mutually unwanted interactions and harm resulting therefrom
are by-products of individually desired and beneficial, but uncoordi-
nated, activities of two or more actors.
This analytical point undergirds the prevalent social policies toward
crimes and contracts, on the one hand, and torts, on the other hand. For
coercive interactions, identified as crimes, the socially desirable volume is
zero.53 Such interactions perversely improve the perpetrator’s well-being
by inflicting suffering on the victim. Coercion and free exchange are
functional opposites. Correspondingly, for mutually wanted interactions,
identified as contracts, the socially desirable volume is one hundred
percent. Such interactions improve the actors’ well-being and navigate
assets to their most efficient users.54 Unsurprisingly, criminal law imposes
a general ban on coercive interactions of all kinds.55 Contract law, on the
51. See infra notes 478–479 and accompanying text (specifying certain liabilities that
cannot be waived).
52. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 11, at 917 (describing and criticizing
the prevalent understanding of tort law as “accident-law-plus”); John Fabian Witt, Toward
a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-
Party Insurance Movement, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 690, 699–706 (2001) (explaining how our
tort system transformed itself into accident law over the course of the last two centuries).
53. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The optimal
amount of fraud is zero . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev.
193, 194 (1991) (“[T]here cannot be an ‘optimal’ rate of crime . . . .”).
54. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 95; see also Robin Kar,
Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 760–61, 771–76 (2016) (explaining
contract law as advancing and mediating between autonomy, liberty, efficiency, fairness,
and trust).
55. See Stein, Corrupt Intentions, supra note 3, at 61 (“[T]he legal system should
impose criminal liability on a person who advances his goals by using force or artifice
instead of a voluntary exchange [because these] are inherently coercive behaviors, un-
responsive to the market mechanisms that put exchange prices on what people want to
achieve.”).
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other hand, facilitates voluntary bargains and makes them generally
enforceable.56
With mutually unwanted interactions, identified as accidents, things
are markedly different. The socially desirable volume of such interactions
cannot be zero because, unlike crimes, such interactions are not stand-
alones and thus cannot be suppressed individually. The legal system can
only suppress them together with the accompanying beneficial activities.57
Benefits generated by some of those activities—medical care, air trans-
portation, and many others—are socially indispensable. Whether the law
should ban an accident consequently depends (among other things) on
the difference between the expected harm and the ban’s social cost that
includes the foregone benefit.58 From a global social standpoint, the
ban’s cost includes not only the cost of formulating and enforcing the
appropriate legal rules but also the lesser of the following two costs: (1)
the cost of implementing safety measures that prevent the accident59 and
(2) the value of the beneficial activity that causes the accident.60 When
this aggregate cost is greater than the expected harm, banning the acci-
dent would be against society’s interest.61
Because accidents are not contracts, their socially desirable volume
cannot be one hundred percent either. Harm resulting from an accident
may well exceed the value of the activity that causes the accident. Worse
yet, mutually unwanted interactions do not replicate free exchange in
allocating the resulting benefits and harms. Absent contractual restraint
or other penalties that make actors internalize the costs of their activities,
a self-seeking individual will engage in any activity that benefits her
privately. The prospect of causing harm to other people, as well as the
amount of such externalized harm, would not enter into her cost-benefit
calculation.62
Because accidents are not normative equals of one another, the tort
system has no choice but to regulate them discriminately rather than on
a global basis. Legal frameworks from which tort law draws the requisite
rules, remedies, and penalties account for yet another important
56. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 95.
57. See Calabresi, Costs of Accidents, supra note 19, at 17–18 (arguing accidents and
beneficial activities are intertwined).
58. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 85–88 (outlining cost-benefit analysis as a
guiding principle of accident law).
59. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191 (explaining the
relevance of precaution costs for identifying tortious conduct).
60. See id. (alluding to the need to account for expected benefits).
61. See Calabresi, Costs of Accidents, supra note 19, at 18–20, 26–31; Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191–96 (illustrating the cost-benefit analysis).
62. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1882–83 (noting shareholders’
limited liability makes the firm willing to increase profits by externalizing tort risks to third
parties).
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difference between mutually wanted, coercive, and mutually unwanted
interactions. Mutually wanted interactions are regulated by private law
that implements the parties’ private agreement. This law informs the
parties—and when it becomes necessary, the court—about the rules,
remedies, and penalties that govern their relationship.63 Coercive inter-
actions, in turn, are regulated by public law that implements society’s
vision of rights and wrongs. This law bans coercive behavior and informs
the prospective perpetrator—and in due course, the prosecutor, the
court, and the victim—about the applicable criminal sanction.64
Accidents, by contrast, are governed by two regulatory mechanisms:
private and public. The private mechanism allocates the risks and the
costs of accidents by applying the principles of fairness and corrective
justice.65 These principles grant every person an entitlement obligating
other people not to expose her to a disproportionate risk of sustaining
harm, while imposing upon her an equivalent obligation toward other
people.66 A risk of harm will cross the proportionality threshold when it
exceeds the expected, socially acceptable, and consequently normal,
level of risk to which people routinely expose each other in their daily
interactions.67 The fairness principle thus distinguishes between reci-
procal, hence permissible, and nonreciprocal, therefore impermissible,
risks of harm.68 Harm resulting from materialization of a reciprocal risk is
considered a misfortune that gives the victim no recourse against another
person. On the other hand, when a victim suffers harm that originates
from a nonreciprocal risk created by another person, that person becomes
liable in tort. The consequence of that liability is the perpetrator’s duty
to make the victim whole by compensating her for the harm caused.69
The public mechanism aims at achieving a different goal: augmen-
tation of social welfare.70 To promote this goal, the mechanism allocates
the financial responsibility for accidental harm in a way that incentivizes
63. See, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 95 (describing the
role of contract law as facilitating parties’ exchange and setting up rules and remedies to
take care of opportunism and unforeseen contingencies).
64. See id. at 253–55 (describing the function of criminal law as setting up prohi-
bitions on and penalties for coercive behavior).
65. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 542 (stating the private law principle of reciprocity
and associating it with corrective justice and fairness).
66. See id. (“Cases of liability are those in which the defendant generates a
disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity.”).
67. See id. at 540–42.
68. See id.
69. See Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 56 (“Corrective justice . . . treats the
wrong, and the transfer of resources that undoes it, as a single nexus of activity and passivity
where actor and victim are defined in relation to each other.”); id. at 62–63 (explaining
corrective justice requires the wrongdoer and the victim be brought back to their pre-wrong
positions).
70. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 1 (arguing tort law is designed to promote
efficiency and therefore optimize social welfare).
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actors to minimize the total sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
preventing accidents.71 The mechanism makes an actor liable to pay for
the victim’s harm when the actor creates a risk of an accident and then
fails to prevent it by taking precautions that cost less than the expected
harm.72
The principal beneficiary of this compensation duty, however, is
society at large, not the victim. The public mechanism imposes this duty
to motivate all actors to prevent accidents when doing so costs less than
the expected harm to the victim.73 The victim recovers compensation for
two reasons. First, she is the most efficient law enforcer: She has a clear
informational advantage over the government, which cannot control
every risk-creating activity. All she needs is a motivation to sue the actor,
and the compensation entitlement gives her that motivation.74 As impor-
tantly, the victim usually needs money to protect her health or another
aspect of personal well-being against further deterioration. Obligating
the defaulting actor to compensate the victim for her harm is the most
effective way of giving the victim the money she needs.75
These mechanisms originate from two conceptually and functionally
separate, yet equally important, branches of the law: private and public.76
Both mechanisms are part of the same system of rules, identified as the
law of torts, but this commonality should not blur the differences between
the private and the public regulation of accidents. These differences are
fundamental.77
Failure to account for these differences distorts the understanding
and application of tort doctrine. As this Article reveals, conflicting tort
theories that allude to corrective justice and fairness, on one side, and to
welfare and economic efficiency, on the other side, talk past each other.
The economic efficiency theory best explains our system’s public regu-
lation of accidents. Corrective justice, on the other hand, offers the most
appealing explanation for the system’s private law aspects. This explana-
tion individuates the duty to avoid accidents by underscoring the bilateral
character of the right against being harmed and the correlative obliga-
71. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191–96.
72. See id. at 192–93.
73. See id.
74. See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence
Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1199, 1219–20 (2001)
[hereinafter Stein, Two Wrongs] (arguing tort victims are best positioned to enforce safety
standards because of their superior information and motivation to sue).
75. Under Judge Guido Calabresi’s system, consequences of the victim’s uncompen-
sated harm count as a “secondary” social cost that needs to be minimized as well. See
Calabresi, Costs of Accidents, supra note 19, at 27–28.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 26–44 (explaining the two mechanisms).
77. See infra section I.C (demonstrating how the private and public mechanisms of
accident regulation use different rules and have different scopes of application).
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tion to avoid harm to another person. The bilateral structure of duties
and rights is a core characteristic of cases falling under the private law of
accidents. For a good illustration of such cases, return to the “bouncy
house” example,78 or consider a tort action successfully prosecuted by a
garden’s owner against a rider of a hot air balloon who crashed into his
flowers and vegetables.79 Cases that call for public regulation involve mul-
tiple interests of unspecified individuals and groups of people that do
not sit well on Hohfeld’s boilerplate.80 The “falling bag” case provides a
good illustration for this public type of case, as it implicates the conve-
nience and security of air passengers in general.81 Corrective justice and
efficiency theories therefore do not compete over the same space in the
system of torts. Instead, they animate two different legal mechanisms—
private and public—that operate alongside one another.
B. The Benefit Principle
Chief among the factors which must be considered is the social value of
the interest which the actor is seeking to advance . . . . The public
interest will justify the use of dangerous machinery, so long as the
benefits outweigh the risk . . . .82
Benefits generated by accident-prone activities are the key to under-
standing how the private and public mechanisms work and the types of
accident to which they apply. Accidental harm is an unwanted by-product
of activities that actors carry out to their benefit without coordinating
with one another. For example, a guest’s injury on a host’s premises is a
by-product of the guest’s use of the premises and the host’s maintenance
of them according to her own vision. Industrial smoke emissions that
reach residential areas are a by-product of factory operations and people
living near the factory. The bouncy house accident is a by-product of
Arnold’s preparation for the party and Victoria residing near Arnold’s
house. The falling bag case, in turn, features an accident that similarly
results from an individually desired, yet imperfectly coordinated, activity:
airplane transportation with overhead compartments that allow for con-
venient storage and removal and occasionally an accidental fall of luggage.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
79. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
80. This refers to Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s system of formal legal
entitlements and their correlatives. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
81. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the facts of the “falling
bag” case).
82. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 31, at 171–72; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Common Law 94–95 (Little, Brown & Co., 45th prtg. 1923) (1881) (rationalizing the
historic shift from strict liability to negligence by the fact that many accident-prone
endeavors benefit society in general and therefore must not be chilled).
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There is a critical distinction among the kinds of benefits generated
by the accident-prone activities in these examples. Some of those bene-
fits—those in the guest injury and bouncy house cases—are private, while
others—those in the smoke pollution and falling bag cases—are public.
Private benefits are ones that improve the well-being of a single person:
the actor (and her private beneficiaries, such as family and friends). Public
benefits, on the other hand, improve the welfare of society in general
(while also generating private gains for their producers). The volume of
public benefits’ production is socially beneficial in and of itself. As this
volume increases, goods and services that people need become more
abundant and more effective, as well as better known and consequently
safer for consumers and society at large.83 Competition among the goods’
and services’ producers—another public benefit—reduces their price for
consumers.84 Benefits that are strictly private generate no such advan-
tages for society.
The distinction between private and public benefits, however, is not
written in stone and has some gray areas as well.85 What courts see as
“private” as opposed to “public,” or vice versa, may not be universally
agreeable and may even be mistaken.86 Furthermore, this distinction
depends on the preferences that exist in a given society.87 For the most
part, however, courts can easily tell whether a benefit is public or private.88
When an accident results from an actor’s pursuit of a strictly private
benefit, courts apply the private mechanism of accident regulation and
its fairness rules. Under this mechanism, an actor assumes liability for
damages she causes to another person when she exposes that person to a
83. See, e.g., Matias Busso & Sebastian Galiani, The Causal Effect of Competition on
Prices and Quality: Evidence from a Field Experiment 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20054, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20054.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing empirical evidence and outlining an
economic theory predicting the volume of competitive production reduces the product’s
prices while guaranteeing quality).
84. See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Classically, the public good is enhanced by free competition in pricing and vigorous and
relatively unfettered advertising and marketing.”).
85. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1351–54 (1982) (questioning the general validity of
the public–private distinction).
86. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931)
(categorizing explosives storage as an activity that benefited the actor alone while ignoring
the activity’s social value).
87. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1423, 1426–28 (1982) (discussing the historical, political, and cultural contingency
of the public–private distinction).
88. Historically, this distinction can be traced to Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s decision
in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 566
(noting Brown v. Kendall “laid the groundwork . . . for exempting socially useful risks from
tort liability”).
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disproportionate, and hence nonreciprocal, risk of harm.89 On the other
hand, when an accident is brought about by an activity that generates
public benefits, courts apply the utility-driven public mechanism.90 Under
this mechanism, an actor can become responsible only for damage she
causes to another person when she fails to take precautions that cost less
than the expected damage.91
Courts draw this distinction for a good reason. When the benefit
incidental to an accident-prone activity is private, allowing the actor to
pursue it by putting another person’s body or property in harm’s way can
never be justified.92 A system that grants actors such a license fails to
accord the victim’s safety interest the same weight it assigns to the actor’s
private gain. By allowing the actor to expose the victim to a risk of harm
and get off scot-free when that risk materializes, the system treats the
actor as worthier than the victim, which is fundamentally unfair. This
unfairness does not diminish when the actor’s private gain exceeds the
economic value of the victim’s safety.93 The fact that the actor gains a lot
by causing the victim a much lesser harm is of no consequence because
the victim’s interest is still being sacrificed for the actor’s private benefit.
Fairness requires that the actor make the victim whole by paying for her
damage. This requirement is the essence of corrective justice.94
This requirement has only one exception that extends to permitted
risky activities. These activities include people’s daily interactions that
create reciprocal risks of harm for individuals involved. Examples of such
activities include driving cars according to traffic rules, walking on a
street, playing football, and rushing into a crowded train. These activities
are considered normal, and hence socially acceptable and not negligent,
for a number of reasons. First, people cannot function in a prosperous
community without being able to carry out these and similar activities.
Risks of accident brought about by these activities are also not severe and
89. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 292 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (noting the
importance of “the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be
advanced or protected by the conduct” in determining negligence); see also id. § 298 cmt.
b (“[I]f the act has little or no social value and is likely to cause any serious harm, it is
reasonable to require close attention and caution.”).
90. See infra notes 169–179, 190–245 and accompanying text (explaining how the
public mechanism works, citing relevant case law, and providing illustrations).
91. See infra note 163 (citing cases that illustrate this point).
92. See Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 62–63 (explaining that allowing one
person to advance her private goals by sacrificing another person’s well-being is
fundamentally unjust).
93. See Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, supra note 11, at 249, 256 [hereinafter Wright,
Standards of Care] (“[I]t is impermissible to use someone as a mere means to your ends
by exposing him (or his resources) to significant foreseeable unaccepted risks, regardless
of how greatly the benefit to you might outweigh the risk to him.”).
94. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 62–63.
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consequently tolerable.95 Most importantly, these risks are reciprocal and
therefore engender no inequality between actors and victims.96
To illustrate this point and see how our tort system regulates accident-
prone activities that generate private benefits, consider a case in which a
guest is injured on the host’s premises. The system properly requires the
premise owner to make her visitors, at a minimum, as safe as she is.97
Failure to provide this level of safety would impose a disproportionate,
hence nonreciprocal, risk of harm on the visitor. Consequently, the owner
must compensate the visitor for the resulting damage. Allowing the owner
to get off scot-free would treat her property right as more valuable than
the guest’s interest in her bodily safety. Any such prioritization violates
the equality equilibrium between the two sides, so our tort system does
not allow it. The same reciprocity standard applies to the bouncy house
case.98 Because Arnold’s benefit from the bouncy house is private, the
tort system cannot put it ahead of Victoria’s safety. The system conse-
quently obligates Arnold to pay Victoria for the damage to her porch.
This payment will restore the balance of equality that Arnold violated.
The tort system need not worry about excessively deterring accident-
prone activities that produce private benefits. Because private benefits
are consumed in their entirety by actors who generate them, each of
these actors must decide for herself whether she values her private bene-
fit strongly enough to risk liability in tort. As importantly, actors acquire
their ability to produce private benefits in a social environment that
protects them against nonreciprocal endangerments by other people.
This protection comes with an obligation to respect that social environ-
95. Consider a case featuring a mobility-trained blind person, familiar with his
surroundings, who accidentally collided with—and injured—another person on his way to
a restroom. Roberts v. State, 396 So. 2d 566, 567–68 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In that case, the
risk of accident to which the defendant exposed the plaintiff was socially acceptable and
hence reciprocal since “[t]he man who is blind . . . is entitled to live in the world and to
have allowance made by others for his disability.” Id. at 567 (quoting W. Prosser, The Law
of Torts, § 32, at 151–52 (4th ed. 1971)). The court therefore properly decided that the
defendant was not negligent. Id. at 569. Notably, this decision of a Louisiana court was
about an activity that pursued a distinctly private benefit. This factor separates the case
from the Louisiana Supreme Court precedents that apply the Learned Hand formula to
accident-causing activities that produced public benefits. See, e.g., Chambers v. Vill. of
Moreauville, 85 So. 3d 593, 597–99 (La. 2012) (holding a public entity assumes liability in
tort only when its action shows negligence under the “risk-utility balancing test [that]
requires balancing the gravity and the risk of harm against the individual and societal uti-
lity and the cost and feasibility of repair”); Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362,
364–65 (La. 1998) (holding a department store not negligent because the social utility of
the hazard it created exceeded the expected harm).
96. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 542.
97. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 60, at 414 (“[T]he guest understands when he
comes that he is to be placed on the same footing as one of the family.”).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
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ment and its safety-related conventions.99 Finally and perhaps most
critically, protection against nonreciprocal endangerments improves the
quality of people’s lives in a civil society: It guarantees them equal free-
dom and promotes their mutual benefit.100 This virtue offsets many of the
private benefits that the reciprocity standard obligates actors to forego.
Things are markedly different when it comes to public benefits. When
an accident-prone activity generates such a benefit, the court “must
decide whether the social value and utility of the hazard outweigh, and
thus justify, its potential harm to others.”101 Consider again the factory
case. Making the factory pay hefty compensation for smoke emissions
may slow down its production, or even close it. As a result, society as a
whole will be denied the benefit of the otherwise affordable goods that
will become more expensive or altogether disappear from the market.
These goods often include food or necessary medication. The tort system
therefore will do well to ascertain whether the smoke seriously imperils
the residents’ health. If it does not, the system should allow the factory to
emit smoke to the extent necessary for its operations. If it does, the
system should allow residents to obtain an injunction against the factory.
Alternatively, the system may allow the factory to emit smoke while
requiring that it compensate residents for the resulting damage. Under
neither scenario should the system evaluate the factory’s conduct by
reference to reciprocal risks or a similar fairness-based standard.
Courts, indeed, do not use any of those standards in cases involving
accident-prone activities that produce public benefits. Instead, they
determine whether the actor acted negligently by applying the Hand
formula.102 Courts accord preference to this formula for a number of
good reasons. The reciprocal risk standard works well in interactions
between individuals that generate no public benefits, but trying to apply
it to actors who produce public benefits—airline companies, manufac-
turers, physicians, government agents, and the like—is very hard, if not
altogether impossible. Corporate, governmental, and professional actors
do not get exposed to the same risks that they create in the course of
their business. Other fairness standards also do not seem to fit here, for a
good reason too. Activities that produce public benefits have multiple
beneficiaries whose interest in the benefits—education, transportation,
food, and medications, to mention just a few—is at least as worthy of
protection as the victim’s safety interest. Critically, the victim herself
enjoys public benefits. She enjoys fast and convenient air transportation
99. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 543 (“The paradigm of reciprocity holds that we
may be expected to bear, without indemnification, those risks we all impose reciprocally
on each other. If we all drive, we must suffer the costs of ordinary driving.”).
100. See Keating, supra note 11, at 342–43.
101. Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. 1998) (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., infra note 163 (citing cases in which courts apply the Hand formula).
For an explanation of the Hand formula, see infra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
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that would have been much slower and more inconvenient if airline
companies were required to retrofit overhead compartments in their
airplanes; she also can afford buying medications that would have been
prohibitively expensive if drug manufacturers’ tort liability were unlimited.
These and other benefits offset victims’ inability to recover compensation
for accidental harm.
The distinction between private and public benefits did not escape
the tort scholars’ attention. Adherents of efficiency goals alluded to this
distinction in various contexts.103 Scholars favoring fairness and correc-
tive justice did so as well.104 Both camps of scholars, however, stopped
short of acknowledging the centrality of this distinction to understanding
how our tort system works. Reasons that explain this omission are not
altogether clear, but they certainly include the conflation of the nor-
mative and the positive theories of tort law.105 Consider, for example,
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner’s seminal treatise
that expounds “the hypothesis that the rules of the Anglo-American
common law of torts are best explained as if designed to promote effi-
ciency in the sense of minimizing the sum of expected damages and costs
of care.”106 Similarly to other economic accounts of tort law,107 this
treatise makes a simplifying assumption that the private costs of avoiding
accidents are the same as the public costs of avoiding accidents.108 This
103. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1028–29 (1990) (distinguishing between private and public risks of
harm); Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1165, 1177–79 (2014)
(distinguishing between social and private benefits and arguing a victim’s compensation
should equal her private loss minus any social benefit generated by the wrongdoer).
104. See, e.g., Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 93, at 263–64 (distinguishing
between defendants who put plaintiffs in harm’s way to promote their private utility and
defendants engaged in socially essential activities).
105. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., On Positive Theories of Tort Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev.
191, 197–99 (1987) (reviewing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law (1987), and showing how the work conflates normative with positive
theories of tort law).
106. Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 312; see also id. at 8 (observing “the noneco-
nomic literature does not provide an alternative positive theory of tort law to the economic
theory expounded in this book”).
107. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 336–37 (5th ed.
2008) (lumping together private and social costs of avoiding accidents); Shavell, supra
note 19, at 178 (treating all costs of care and accidents as social); John Prather Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323, 324–25 (1973) (postulating
every cost of avoiding accidents is social); J. Shahar Dillbary, Tortfest, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev.
953, 956–57 (2013) (showing the addition of actors that inflict the same indivisible harm
can be efficient by treating public benefits from power plants, farming, sewer systems,
landfills, gas stations, cellular phone towers, and cement factories as economically equi-
valent to (albeit not as valuable as) a private benefit from camping); Keith N. Hylton, A
Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977, 996 (1996) (“The total social
benefits from any activity are equal to the sum of private and external benefits . . . .”).
108. Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 87 (presenting and commending a global
cost-benefit analysis).
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assumption makes it fairly easy to calculate the costs of precautions under
the Hand formula, but it also increases those costs for actors who
generate private benefits for themselves and no benefits for society. As a
result, these actors acquire exemptions from liability that have never
been recognized by our courts.
Assume that the balloon rider who became a tort celebrity after
winds pushed him onto another person’s garden did not endanger
anyone’s life or limb and that his thrill and self-fulfillment were more
valuable than the ruined potatoes, radishes, and flowers.109 Under these
assumptions, the Hand formula would exonerate the balloonist at the
garden owner’s expense. Our tort system, however, grants no such exemp-
tions from liability because it refuses to put an actor’s private benefit, no
matter how large it is, ahead of the safety interest of another person. The
balloonist exposed the garden owner to an abnormal, and hence non-
reciprocal, risk of damage and the court therefore properly held him
liable.110 This decision aligns with fairness and corrective justice and has
nothing to do with the Hand formula. Landes and Posner nonetheless
fitted it into their theory by postulating that the balloonist’s activity was
“frivolous” and “not valuable.”111 Based on this postulation, they con-
cluded that having the balloonist pay for the potatoes, radishes, and
flowers, thereby motivating him to abandon ballooning, was “the optimal
method of accident avoidance.”112
This analysis is wrong. The balloonist’s activity was valuable. Putting
it on a general utility scale could make it a fair competitor to the plain-
tiff’s plants. Yet, because this activity generated only a private, rather than
public, benefit, the court properly characterized it as abnormally dan-
gerous. As a general matter, our courts have never allowed an actor’s
private benefit to override a victim’s safety interest. All of their benefit-
versus-safety calculations under the Hand formula or a similar standard
were made in connection with activities generating public benefits.113
Explaining this uniformity by making an artificial postulation that all
private benefits are “frivolous” and have low value thus cannot be right.
109. See Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). This assumption of no
endangerment is warranted because the balloonist’s descent caused no physical injuries to
any other person. In Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., Judge
Posner categorized the balloonist’s adventure as “abnormally dangerous” and triggering
strict liability for the destroyed vegetables and flowers because he “could have crashed into
the crowd rather than into the vegetables,” 916 F.2d 1174, 1176–77 (7th Cir. 1990), but
this reasoning is fundamentally misguided. As the Restatement explains, “[t]his strict
liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
110. Guille, 19 Johns. at 383.
111. Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 114; see also id. at 110 (describing a person’s
owning a ferocious dog as not valuable).
112. Id. at 115.
113. See infra note 163.
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A much better way of understanding our tort system is to acknowledge
and explain the courts’ refusal to ever consider private benefits as an
actor’s justification for imposing a risk of damage on another person.
Consider now the school of thought that views our tort system as a
promoter of fairness and corrective justice. Scholars affiliated with this
school of thought support their positive accounts of the law with a
remarkably small number of court decisions.114 All of those decisions are
about accident-prone activities that generated private benefits for the
actors and no substantial benefits for society.115 The proponents of
fairness and corrective justice offer no explanation for courts’ decisions
that account for public benefits under the Hand formula or a similar
standard. Instead, they make a factually incorrect description of those
decisions by calling them esoteric,116 and they also accuse the formula,
along with the entire economic approach to torts, of setting up a crude
utilitarian regime that sacrifices individuals’ safety for the sake of general
welfare.117 This accusation is false. First, contrary to what some corrective
justice scholars say about the Hand formula,118 this formula, as applied by
our courts, does not allow private benefits to determine the actor’s costs
of precautions. Second and most important, the inclusion of public
benefits in calculating the costs of precautions does not sacrifice any
individual’s safety for the sake of social welfare. Rather, our tort system
reduces the safety of all individuals to the extent necessary for the cost-
effective production of public benefits that those individuals enjoy.119
When a person enjoys public benefits on equal terms with other
members of her society while being exposed to a cost-justified risk of
114. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 15
(1995) (citing no court decisions); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1999, 2033–40 (2007) (arguing the negligence standard is animated by “civil
competency” rather than by the Hand formula but citing no American cases).
115. See, e.g., Guille, 19 Johns. at 383; infra note 241 (citing cases).
116. E.g., Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,” 4
Theoretical Inquiries L. 145, 148 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Myth of Hand Formula]
(“[T]he aggregate-risk-utility test is infrequently mentioned by the courts, almost never
included in jury instructions, rarely actually employed in judicial opinions, and almost
never explains the actual results reached by the courts.”); see also Ronald J. Allen & Ross
M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of
Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 683, 701–04 (2002) (asserting the “real world
of negligence litigation” has rarely employed the Hand formula); Stephen G. Gilles, The
Invisible Hand Formula, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1046–47 (1994) (suggesting parties rarely
make cost-benefit arguments).
117. See, e.g., Wright, Myth of Hand Formula, supra note 116, at 146–48.
118. See id. at 147 (suggesting the Hand formula runs contrary to the common-sense
morality under which imposition of foreseeable risks on others violates equal dignity and
autonomy and is unjust, regardless of the benefit to the risk creator).
119. This core principle originates from Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873),
and similar decisions. Infra notes 190–203 and accompanying text; see also Parsons v.
Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1997) (noting this principle is more than 150
years old).
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sustaining uncompensated accidental harm, she is not making any
personal sacrifice. Indeed, she can use the savings she makes from being
able to enjoy public benefits at a low or zero cost for purchasing first-
party insurance. A person will have a morally valid complaint against the
system when she is denied equal enjoyment of public benefits,120 but then
her remedy should be the elimination of the inequality rather than
removal of the Hand formula.
C. Public vs. Private Mechanism of Accident Regulation
For a number of reasons, the public mechanism of accident regula-
tion works better than the private mechanism in controlling accident-
prone activities that produce public benefits. The public mechanism
improves society’s welfare along three economic dimensions that the
private mechanism leaves out. These dimensions are the scarcity of goods,
positive externalities, and economies of scale.
Begin with scarcity. Producers of goods or services who pay substan-
tial amounts of compensation to tort victims might reach a breaking
point that will force them to revise their business plans. They will need to
choose between discontinuing the goods’ production and making the
goods safer than before. Discontinuing the goods’ production will reduce
competition on the market for those goods. The goods’ prices will then
go up, and fewer people will be able to afford them. Safety improvement
will also decrease the goods’ affordability. The goods’ producers will shift
the improvement’s cost (or part of that cost) to people who need those
goods by charging them higher prices.
To be sure, the increase of production costs is not always to society’s
detriment. When the goods can be produced more safely at an econo-
mically attractive cost, the tort system will do well to impose liability upon
actors who fail to implement the appropriate safety measures. However,
when the relevant safety measures cost more than the expected damage,
the system should avoid imposing liabilities, since doing so will slow down
the production of the goods to society’s detriment.
Fairness-based rules that go into the private mechanism of accident
regulation do nothing to prevent such chilling effects. Indeed, these
rules’ pivotal goal is to give individuals safety rights that cannot be set
aside on utilitarian grounds. As already explained, these rules make
perfect sense when applied to accident-prone activities that generate
120. Remarkably, progressive critics of the American tort system gloss over the inequi-
ties in the allocation of public benefits. See generally, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Torts, in The
Politics of Law 445, 449–62 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (criticizing the tort system for
failing to remedy inequities in allocation of risks of harm and for commodifying pain,
suffering, and personal relations).
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strictly private benefits for actors.121 Scarcity of private benefits is not a
huge problem for society at large. Using fairness-based rules to stifle the
production of public benefits, however, is not a good social policy. Unsur-
prisingly, our tort system has never adopted that policy and its broad
criteria for negligence. Instead, it narrows liability for producers of
public benefits by capping their requisite precautions against accidents at
the cost of the expected harm.122
Consider now positive externalities. Activities that benefit society at
large produce three types of benefit: direct, systemic, and informational.
The direct benefit is delivered by the actor’s immediate activity: for
instance, a cataract surgery or a flight from Philadelphia to Boston. The
systemic benefit is produced by the activity’s contribution to the compe-
tition on the market for the underlying good. Increased competition
increases production and, correspondingly, decreases the good’s scarcity
and price. The good consequently becomes more affordable to people
who need it. The good’s competitive production and multiple uses also
generate valuable information about its utility and safety.123 These benefits
provide another compelling reason for the tort system to use the public
mechanism that limits the costs of precautions against accidents to the
amount of the expected harm.
Boilerplate rules that realize economies of scale are another virtue
of the public mechanism of accident regulation. Activities generating
public benefits are recurrent and so are the accidents that result from
these activities.124 Boilerplate rules equip courts with decisional shortcuts
for determining negligence and causation in multiple cases that involve
the same factual pattern. These shortcuts include presumptions of fault
and the consequent responsibility for the accident that courts must auto-
matically assign to actors (and sometimes to victims as well).125 Under
products liability rules, for example, manufacturers, sellers, and suppliers
of a product identified as defective automatically assume liability for
121. See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text (justifying the fairness-based
rules as applied to activities generating private benefits).
122. See infra section II.B (discussing in detail how courts define negligence for
producers of public benefits and providing examples).
123. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205, 211
(1973) (“[C]ompetition among sellers generates [safety-related] information about the
products sold.”).
124. Accident-prone activities that produce strictly private benefits are not as recurrent
as activities that produce public benefits. This difference may have to do with our culture
that prioritizes work over leisure. See David Sturt & Todd Nordstrom, Why Americans
Don’t Like Vacations . . . or Work, Forbes (June 10, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
davidsturt/2014/06/10/why-americans-dont-like-vacations-or-work (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (explaining the shortage of leisure opportunities for Americans is caused by
“our culture that believes, at its core, that the harder we work, the more we will succeed”).
125. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J.
557, 563–64 (1992) (showing rules are best suited to regulate recurrent conduct).
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damages resulting from the product’s defect.126 The victim does not need
to prove that the defect resulted from the actor’s failure to take pre-
cautions that cost less than the expected damage.127 Based on past
experience and general knowledge, the rules presume that this failure is
present.128 Boilerplate rules also include statutory and regulatory duties
to take specified precautions against certain types of accidents.129 Failure
to take those precautions constitutes negligence per se, and the court
must deem the actor liable for the resulting accident.130 Boilerplate rules
include presumptions of adequate care as well.131 These presumptions
provide a predetermined list of precautions against accident that actors
must implement. Actors complying with this list are deemed faultless and
will bear no liability for accidents that might still happen.132
Causation rules used by the public mechanism rely on statistics and
public policy.133 Occasionally, they also shift the burden of proof to negli-
gent actors by requiring them to provide evidence disassociating their
negligence from the victim’s damage.134 Similar to the negligence pre-
126. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, §§ 98–99, at 692–702.
127. Id. § 98, at 693.
128. Id.; see also Scott v. Dutton-Lainson Co., 774 N.W.2d 501, 504–06 (Iowa 2009)
(explaining manufacturing-defect claims do not require proof of inadequate precautions);
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (supporting the
strict liability rule and observing “[i]n many cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused
by manufacturer negligence but plaintiffs have difficulty proving it”).
129. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 36, at 229–31.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 233.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936–38 (Cal. 1980) (finding
manufacturers of a carcinogenic drug liable according to their shares in the market of the
drug); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828–35 (Mass. 2008) (imposing liability
for lost chances to recover); Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 327–37 (Minn. 2013)
(imposing liability for a victim’s reduced chance to survive). For an early decision that
relied on statistics and public policy in determining causation, see Stubbs v. City of
Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 139–40 (N.Y. 1919). For an analysis of current law, see Ariel Porat
& Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty 59–67 (2001) [hereinafter Porat & Stein,
Tort Liability Under Uncertainty] (analyzing market-share liability cases); Ariel Porat &
Alex Stein, Indeterminate Causation and Apportionment of Damages: An Essay on Holtby,
Allen, and Fairchild, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 667, 682–88 & n.47 (2003) [hereinafter
Porat & Stein, Indeterminate Causation] (analyzing decisions that imposed liability for lost
chances to recover and increased risk of injury and criticizing their calculus of damages).
See generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs,
19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 721–26 (1990) (analyzing policy reasons for awarding victims
fractional probability-based compensation).
134. See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (“In the last
fifty years the strictness of the requirement that the plaintiff show that without defendant’s
act or omission the accident would not have occurred has been mitigated in several types
of cases. . . . [T]he modern trend is to place the burden on the defendants to disprove
causation.”); see also, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 475–78 (Cal. 1970) (en
banc) (requiring a negligent defendant to disprove causation).
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sumptions, these rules create decisional shortcuts that utilize the existing
knowledge to streamline courts’ decisions on causation issues. Causation
rules that belong to the public mechanism serve yet another—more
fundamental—purpose. They incentivize actors to take cost-efficient pre-
cautions against damage.135 To create this incentive, the rules narrow
causality-based escape routes, or exits, from liability for negligent actors.136
These rules bring into our tort system the advantages and the disad-
vantages of standardization. Standardization is good for our system for
three reasons: (1) It tells actors what precautions they should take to fend
off the prospect of paying tort compensation, (2) it saves time and
resources that courts would otherwise have to spend on adjudicating
complex issues of liability and causation, and (3) it also reduces the possi-
bility of judicial error in determinations of liability.137 Standardization of
liability, however, also has a downside: It increases the risk of liability for
innovators working on safety improvements and induces them to slow
down, and sometimes altogether abandon, the innovation process.138 The
overall trade-off between the systemic gains from standardization and the
innovation losses may still be positive, but our tort system can still make
itself more welcoming of innovation.139
Causation rules that belong to the public mechanism thus sail apart
from the private law rules of causation. “Cause in fact” and “proximate
cause” rules that go into the private mechanism of accident regulation
focus on the etiology of the victim’s damage and whether it falls within
the scope of the risk to which the actor exposed the victim in violation of
the victim’s entitlement to safety.140 The private mechanism of accident
regulation uses these strict rules to ensure that tort compensation rights
the wrong and creates no shortfalls, windfalls, or spillovers.141 This
135. See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 229 (explaining that welfare-driven rules
of causation must be formulated to incentivize cost-efficient precautions against damage).
136. See infra notes 301–343 and accompanying text (citing decisions relaxing
causation requirements for public policy reasons).
137. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 165, 175
(2015) [hereinafter Parchomovsky & Stein, Catalogs] (noting “the scholarly consensus . . .
that under realistic conditions . . . [bright-line] rules are superior to standards in guiding
individual behavior, as well as in enhancing social welfare, since rules reduce adjudicative
costs and minimize the twin risks of judicial error and misuse”).
138. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
285, 286–89, 303–08 (2008) (demonstrating the tort system’s reliance on customary tech-
nologies as benchmarks for adequate care stifles innovation).
139. See id. at 308–14 (offering ways to remedy the tort system’s anti-innovation bias).
140. See Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 10–11.
141. See id. at 11–12 (“[W]hile a functionalist might regard causation as an indirect
way of achieving market deterrence or some other extrinsic goal, an internal account
treats causation as causation, that is, as a concept that represents the unidirectional sequence
from action to effect.”); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1735,
1788–98, 1827–28 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Causation in Tort Law] (interpreting
“cause in fact” to require the defendant’s wrongful act be a “necessary element of a
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mechanism sets up a framework of corrective justice and fairness between
the actor and the victim inter se. This framework positions individuals’
entitlements to safety above augmentation of welfare.
The public mechanism also does not skip over compensation that
tort victims recover. This mechanism uses special damage rules that
remedy the overenforcement and underenforcement of the law.142 The
rules do so, respectively, by decreasing and increasing the victim’s com-
pensation amount relative to her actual damage.143 They set aside the
strict foundational requirement of the private mechanism that tort
compensation fit the victim’s actual damage. Importantly, these rules also
become applicable when the private mechanism systematically fails to
punish tortfeasors due to the scarcity of evidence, high litigation costs, or
a similar predicament. Under any such scenario, the safety problem stops
being private and becomes public, which triggers the application of the
public mechanism and its compensation rules.
* * *
This reconceptualization of the law of torts has profound
implications for doctrine and theory. Tort doctrine is generally perceived
as a law of harms,144 yet it is also, in a large measure, a law of benefits.
Although tort doctrine is commonly understood as consisting of three
core components—negligence, damage, and causation—that apply across
the board, this unified view is semantically correct but substantively
incomplete and misguided. Substantively, each of the three components
of the tort doctrine has two different meanings: private and public. The
concept of negligence animating the public mechanism of accident regu-
lation is not identical to negligence under the private mechanism.
Causation and damage rules used by the two mechanisms are also far
from being functional twins. Our tort doctrine consequently has six core
components rather than three.
sufficient set” of causes (NESS) leading to the plaintiff’s damage and associating this
requirement with corrective justice).
142. See infra section IV.A (explaining how damages rules are applied differently in
public and private cases).
143. See infra section IV.A.
144. See, e.g., Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 1, at 4–5 (describing the tort system as
rules remedying wrongful inflictions of harm by entitling victims to compensation from
wrongdoers).
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II. NEGLIGENCE: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
A. Theory
“Negligence” has two textbook definitions.145 According to one of
them, an actor can be negligent only in a second-personal sense. That is,
an actor becomes negligent only when she acts unreasonably toward
another human being, and by doing so, she puts that person—identified
as a “neighbor”—in harm’s way.146 To act “unreasonably,” the actor must
do something that exposes the neighbor to a disproportionate or non-
reciprocal risk of harm—an endangerment that exceeds the level of risk
socially accepted as necessary, disrespects the neighbor’s reasonable
expectation for safety, and violates the equality between the parties by
unilaterally prioritizing her interest above the neighbor’s.147 Under this
framework, an actor owes her potential victim a duty to avoid negligence
when she takes an action that exposes the victim to a risk of damage or,
alternatively, undertakes to keep the victim out of harm’s way. By endan-
gering another person or by making that person rely on her help, the
actor makes that person entitled to her precautions against harm. This
entitlement obligates the actor to treat the victim’s safety interest as
equally important as her own goals.148
This broad formulation of negligence squarely belongs to private
law. It builds on fairness, corrective justice, and a bilateral relationship
between the actor and her potential victim.149 Under this formulation,
the actor–victim relationship encompasses the victim’s authority over the
actor, the actor’s accountability to the victim, and the restorative compen-
sation that the actor must pay the victim when her negligence causes the
victim harm.150 The negligence doctrine thus protects the victim’s safety
interest only when the actor does something to affect the safety of that
specific victim. Any such victim-related action makes the actor accoun-
table to the victim. This second-personal accountability and the victim’s
correlative authority to make the actor pay for the harm done do not
depend on any general socioeconomic policies. Instead, they are
determined by the specifics of the parties’ relationship, their mutual
145. See Keith N. Hylton, Tort Law: A Modern Perspective 102–21 (2016) (outlining
moral and economic definitions of negligence).
146. See Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 11, at 38–39.
147. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 540–42.
148. Id. at 547, 550, 554, 569 (underscoring the importance of equal protection
against risk of harm).
149. See Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 62–66 (explaining that equality
between doer and sufferer and the correlativity of their relationship are essential
characteristics of corrective justice).
150. See Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and
Accountability 5–9 (2006).
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expectations, and their duty to treat one another with equal concern and
respect.151
Another definition of negligence—popularized as the Learned
Hand or the Hand-Posner formula—is narrower.152 While adopting what
this Article calls the public mechanism of accident regulation, the Hand
formula definition hews to economic efficiency.153 Under this definition,
an actor must accompany her risky activity with precautions that mount
an economically efficient response to another person’s expected harm
(calculated by multiplying the harm’s probability by its negative dollar
value or the cost of fixing the harm).154 Correspondingly, an actor be-
comes negligent only when she can prevent the harm to another person
by taking precautions that cost less than the expected harm but fails to
do so. Formally, an actor is negligent when B < PL, with B denoting the
cost, or the burden, of the requisite precautions against harm, and P and
L representing, respectively, the probability and the magnitude of the
loss that the actor’s contemplated activity might bring about.155 To put it
in marginal terms, any precaution that the actor can add to the precau-
tions already taken becomes mandated when its cost falls below the value
of the ensuing reduction in the harm’s probability or magnitude.156
Scholars disagree over which of these definitions is the more attrac-
tive from a normative standpoint.157 This disagreement stems from the
more general competition between fairness and utility that has no easy or
accepted solution.158 Scholars are also divided over the meaning of
“negligence” under positive law and which of the two definitions cap-
tures that meaning the closest.159 As part of that debate, scholars have
carried out quantitative studies of American courts’ negligence deci-
sions.160 These studies show that most courts do not expressly rely on the
151. Stephen Darwall, Morality, Authority, and Law 135–39 (2013).
152. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (putting
forth the original statement of the Hand formula); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
supra note 19, at 192–93 (stating the Hand formula in marginal terms).
153. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191–93 (relating the
Hand formula to efficiency).
154. Id. at 192.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 11, 19 (citing sources from different schools of thought).
158. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 52–61 (2002)
(arguing against fairness and in favor of policies driven by welfare economics).
159. Compare Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 194–96 (attesting
that courts have adopted the Hand formula), with Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 116, at
700–01 (arguing courts do not use the Hand formula), Gilles, supra note 116, at 1046–47
(same), and Wright, Myth of Hand Formula, supra note 116, at 150 (same).
160. See Wright, Myth of Hand Formula, supra note 116, at 151–52 (summarizing
studies that conclude courts rarely use the Hand formula, with the Louisiana Supreme
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit being the only
exceptions).
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Hand formula.161 More contestably, the studies also claim that most courts
do not use this formula even implicitly.162
This claim is overstated. In fact, courts routinely compare costs of
precautions with expected harm, and they have done so even since
decades before the invention of the Hand formula.163 Furthermore, courts
not using the Hand formula expressly do not make negligence decisions
in a normative vacuum. They must use some criteria to distinguish
negligent from non-negligent behavior. Whether those criteria include
fairness and corrective justice is a separate question that awaits resolu-
tion. But the existing quantitative studies fail to show affirmatively—and
hence do not establish—that courts base their negligence decisions on
fairness and corrective justice.164
The absence of a clear precedent that prefers one negligence defi-
nition to another is not surprising. Courts need not commit themselves
to some specific notion of fairness or efficiency as a decisive criterion for
all negligence decisions. Nor do they need to adopt, once and for all, the
private or the public mechanism of accident regulation. For common law
courts, using these mechanisms interchangeably, by adjusting them to
161. Id. at 151.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 662 (1873) (affirming the negligence
finding against a railroad company that failed to prevent a both foreseeable and serious
accident that injured the plaintiff without incurring “any . . . expense or inconvenience”
besides “the trifling expense of replacing [the] latch”); Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93–
94 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (finding a trolley company not responsible for an electro-
cution of a boy who swung a wire from across the bridge bringing it in contact with the
trolley wire, because the probability of such an accident was too small while the burden of
precautions was enormous); see also Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673, 676–77 (N.H.
1940) (formulating negligence as a matter of cost-benefit analysis); Osborne v. Montgomery,
234 N.W. 372, 376 (Wis. 1931) (same); Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 104 (analyzing
Osborne and Cooley); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 29–35
(1972) (sampling 1,528 decisions on accidents delivered by appellate courts between 1875
and 1905 to show courts’ massive reliance on cost-benefit analysis in identifying negli-
gence); Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42–44 (1915) (outlining the
negligence doctrine through cost-benefit analysis used by courts). For contemporary
decisions applying the formula, see, e.g., In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 284–85 (2d
Cir. 2008); Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 369 F.3d 978, 997 (6th Cir. 2004); McCarty v.
Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1556–58 (7th Cir. 1987); Chambers v. Village of
Moreauville, 85 So. 3d 593, 597–98 (La. 2012); Levi v. Sw. La. Elec. Membership Coop.,
542 So. 2d 1081, 1087 (La. 1989); Spagnulo v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., No.
2003191, 2006 WL 1238671, at *4–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006); Jerkins v. Anderson, 922 A.2d
1279, 1286–87 (N.J. 2007); Smith v. Johnston, 591 P.2d 1260, 1262–63 (Okla. 1978); Raab
v. Utah Ry. Co., 221 P.3d 219, 232–33 (Utah 2009); see also Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 716 S.E.2d
910, 915 (S.C. 2011) (adopting Judge Posner’s formulation of a business owner’s obli-
gation to protect patrons from crime as a duty to “‘increase its expenditures on security
until the last dollar buys a dollar in reduced expected crime costs [to patrons]’” (quoting
Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2007))).
164. See supra note 116 (citing studies that only show courts rarely apply the Hand
formula).
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the circumstances of individual cases, is often a more sensible strategy.165
Case-specific factors often indicate what mechanism should govern the
case at hand. For cases involving an accident-prone activity that produces
a predominantly private benefit, the fairness-based private mechanism of
accident regulation would be more befitting. Cases involving substantial
public benefits, on the other hand, call for the application of the effi-
ciency-driven public mechanism.
If the Hand formula were to apply to a case brought by a guest who
is injured on his host’s premises, the court would have to carry out an
investigation into how to maintain the owner’s property most effectively
in view of the potential hazard to the guest. This investigation would
usually be costly and unproductive. Worse yet, it would also undermine
the foundational assumption of property law that private uses of property,
even idiosyncratic ones, are most efficient.166 Even in the best case scena-
rio, in which the court successfully identifies the owner’s path to a cost-
effective allocation of risks and resources, this information and the
court’s decision would be good only for the case at bar. Thus the court’s
investigation would generate no economies of scale. All of its costs would
go into one single case instead of being spread across many decisions
that use the same or similar information.
In adjudicating accident-causing activities that produce private bene-
fits, courts therefore will do well to steer away from the Hand formula.
Instead, they should focus on the parties’ expectations from each other.
Under this private law criterion, the guest justifiably expected the owner
to treat his safety on her premises as equally valuable as her own safety
for a simple reason: Premise owners routinely instill this expectation in
their guests. The premise owner therefore impliedly commits herself to
this conventional practice by inviting the guest to her premises.167 To
satisfy this justified expectation, the owner must protect the guest against
every known hazard. Failure to do so would constitute negligence.168
Compare this scenario with a falling accident that takes place at a
hospital, a nursing home, or a department store—a category of cases
involving systematic production of public benefits. For such cases, the
Hand formula is most suitable because the guidance it provides helps
165. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1543, 1568–70 (2010) (providing an insightful
account of common law’s incrementalism in the intellectual property context).
166. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1727–
31, 1755–56 (2004) (defending a decentralized property system in which owners increase
wealth by making individualized choices between utilizations of assets that are numerous
and heterogeneous).
167. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 61, at 422 (rationalizing premise owners’
liability on the implied assurance of safety and noting this rationale is prevalent).
168. See id. § 60, at 412–13.
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courts make decisions that enhance social welfare.169 This guidance is
both implementable and cost effective: Acting upon it in every case would
minimize the overall costs of accidents and precautions against accidents.
Equally importantly, the guidance will also be generalizable: Courts can
deduce from it specific rules of conduct that actors in the relevant
industry can easily understand and follow. Formulating such guidance
therefore generates economies of scale that justify the costs of the courts’
investigations.
The factory case falls into the same “public benefit” category. The
Hand formula consequently will work well in that case, too. Indeed, the
formula offers here the only plausible criterion that the court can use to
determine negligence, since the fairness-based criteria would not work
well. Trying to apply the reciprocity or another fairness criterion to this
and similar cases would produce a stalemate. Fairness cannot tell how
much smoke the factory can emit nor does it offer a compelling reason
for enjoining the factory from emitting smoke altogether by stopping or
slowing down its operation. Because residents also enjoy public benefits
generated by this or other factories, their claim against smoke emissions
becomes compelling only when those emissions are more detrimental
than beneficial to society.
Requiring that the factory treat residents’ safety as equally valuable
as its own safety would also be futile. This criterion works well only when
an actor’s risky activity generates a private benefit for herself and no
public benefits whatsoever. Cases involving public benefits provide no
equality benchmark that courts can work with. There is therefore only
one plausible standard that courts can use. They can, and indeed should,
require that the factory take precautions commensurate with the magni-
tude and the probability of the harm caused by the smoke. Under this
standard, the factory and similar actors will be obligated to take every
precaution that costs less than the damage it prevents. There is nothing
in the fairness concept that could expand the residents’ entitlement to
the factory’s precautions beyond this economic threshold.
To sum up, in cases involving accident-prone activities that generate
public benefits, fairness standards provide no reconciliation for the
parties’ conflicting claims concerning the scope of the actor’s duty of
care. The victim’s appeal to fairness will thus never be strong enough to
block or slow down the accident-prone production of public benefits.
Because fairness also favors the undisrupted supply of socially valuable
goods, any such appeal will be tautological and devoid of substance. The
Hand formula therefore provides a much more preferable solution for
such cases.
This analysis helps explain the intuitive appeal of two conflicting, yet
influential, tort theories developed respectively by Professor George
169. See id. § 61, at 425–27.
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Fletcher and Judge Richard Posner.170 Fletcher’s theory distinguishes
between actors’ reciprocal and nonreciprocal exposures to a risk of
harm.171 Reciprocal exposures are legitimate and hence not wrongful,
while nonreciprocal exposures are illegitimate and wrongful.172 Recipro-
city of the risks that actors both face and create for each other sets up an
equilibrium between those actors.173 An actor is at fault when she disrupts
that equilibrium by exposing the potential victim to a disproportionate—
and hence excessive and nonreciprocal—risk of sustaining damage.174 An
actor also acts negligently when she creates a reciprocal risk for another
person but fails to take the normal precautions to fend off the prospect
of harm for that person. Such failures, too, violate the reciprocity
requirement.175
Posner’s theory, on the other hand, holds that an actor is negligent
when she fails to act according to the Hand formula.176 Whenever an
actor creates a risk for another person or undertakes to guard against
such risk, she ought to take all available precautions that cost less than
the expected damage they prevent.177 The expected damage benchmark
for precautions profoundly differs from Fletcher’s reciprocity benchmark.
Under the expected damage benchmark, an actor must discount the full
amount of the anticipated harm by her probability of not causing that
harm.178 For example, when an actor has a ten percent chance of causing
harm in the amount of $100,000, she must think of herself as standing to
inflict on the prospective victim a $10,000 damage. Consequently, the
cost of precautions the actor would have to take is capped at $10,000.
This calculation presupposes repeated conduct that randomly
distributes precautions across multiple cases. In ninety percent of those
cases, these precautions are completely unnecessary because the pros-
pective victim would stay out of harm’s way even if the actor does not
implement them. As a result, the actor wastes up to $10,000 on each of
170. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191–94; Fletcher, supra
note 11, at 540–43.
171. For another theory of reciprocity in risk imposition, see Charles Fried, An
Anatomy of Values 183–206 (1970).
172. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 540–43.
173. Id.; see also id. at 547 (indicating the reciprocity standard justifies the “level of
risk to which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares”).
174. Id. at 542.
175. Fletcher’s theory alludes to “strict liability,” but it actually incorporates fault. Id. at
543–44. Under this theory, actors assume responsibility only when they impose nonreci-
procal, and hence excessive, risks of harm upon other people. Id. at 542. Actors are also
excused when they cause accidents they could not reasonably avoid. Id. at 541. Fletcher
expressly acknowledges that his notions of strict liability and negligence overlap with each
other in most cases. Id. at 549.
176. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 191–92.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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those individually unspecified cases. The upside of this strategy is the
remaining ten percent of the cases: In each of those cases, the actor
prevents a $100,000 damage by spending at most $10,000 on precautions.
This randomizing strategy also produces defensible results in cases in
which precautions capable of preventing the damage cost more than the
expected damage. For example, when an actor has a ten-percent chance
of causing harm in the amount of $100,000, which can only be prevented
by taking precautions that cost $15,000, the Hand formula would not
impose a duty to take the precautions. This exemption has an upside: In
ninety percent of the cases, in which the actor’s precautions are not
needed at all, not taking them saves $15,000 per case. The exemption,
however, also has a downside: It permits the actor to cause damage in the
amount of $100,000, preventable at $15,000, in ten percent of the cases.
The Hand formula works best with activities that produce public
benefits. Any other formulation of negligence would either overprotect
or underprotect the victims’ safety interest. Exonerating the actor who
could avoid damaging the victim by taking precautions that cost less than
the expected damage would give the victim insufficient protection. The
victim’s safety interest would thus be sacrificed for no good reason.
Conversely, holding the actor negligent when the cost of precautions is
greater than the expected damage would overprotect the victim by
allowing her safety interest to block the production of a more valuable
public benefit. The American system does not give accident victims such
enhanced protection because they cannot justifiably claim it for them-
selves while enjoying public benefits, the affordability of which depends
on keeping the costs of precautions against accidents economically fea-
sible.179 Similar to other people affected by their society’s collective
choices, accident victims must take the bitter with the sweet.180
With the private benefits that society does not enjoy, things are
profoundly different, for the tort system does not privilege an actor’s
private benefit over the victim’s safety interest upon finding the benefit to
be more valuable.181 Because the victim does not partake of the benefit,
the system does not allow the actor to compromise the victim’s safety and
get off scot-free while generating that benefit for herself. When such an
actor exposes the victim to a nonreciprocal risk of sustaining damage and
the risk materializes, the system obligates the actor to compensate the
victim, consistent with Fletcher’s interpretation of “fault.”182
179. See supra text accompanying note 102 (illustrating the trade-off).
180. See generally Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 18–24 (1978)
(explaining the inevitability of social trade-offs that compromise individuals’ personal
safety).
181. See supra section I.B (giving reasons for treating private benefits differently).
182. This principle was well formulated by Lord Reid in the landmark British House of
Lords decision, Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 850 (HL) 867 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“What
a man must not do . . . is to create [substantial] risk . . . . In considering that matter . . . I
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Fletcher’s theory assigns no significance to the economic efficiency
of actors’ conduct.183 For that theory, the only thing that matters is
whether the actor violated the equality equilibrium by exposing the
victim to a nonreciprocal—and hence excessive—risk of harm.184 More
fundamentally, Fletcher’s theory a priori rejects Judge Posner’s utilitarian
license to sacrifice a victim’s $100 asset when avoiding the asset’s
destruction costs the actor more than $100. The whole point of that
theory and all other fairness-based accounts of the tort system is to
impose a deontological constraint on actors’ freedom to risk other
people’s well-being.185 Unsurprisingly, all of the court decisions that
Fletcher uses to illustrate his theory involve accident-prone activities that
generate private benefits or benefits assumed to be private.186 His other
examples do not support the theory.187 By the same token, Judge Posner’s
do not think . . . it . . . right to [consider] the difficulty of remedial measures. If cricket
cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk . . . it should not be
played there at all.”); see also Wright, Myth of Hand Formula, supra note 116, at 185–88,
211 (stating negligence law does not allow a person “to put others at even greater risk for
[her] solely private benefit if [her] expected private gain outweighs the others’ expected
losses” while acknowledging that courts resort to utility calculations in cases involving
public benefits). But see Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 147–52 (commenting that
Lord Reid’s formulation represents “the English and Commonwealth approach to
reasonable care,” which contrasts with American tort law’s broad application of the Hand
formula).
183. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 540, 569–70 (arguing “[t]he social costs and utility
of the risk are irrelevant” and individuals’ right to be protected against unexcused
nonreciprocal risks trumps social utility). But see id. at 571 (acknowledging “the paradigm
of reasonableness” based on a cost-benefit analysis of actors’ behavior “still holds sway over
the thinking of American courts”).
184. See id. at 569–70.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 544 n.21 (citing McKee v. Trisler, 143 N.E. 69, 69 (Ill. 1924) (adjudi-
cating the killing of the plaintiff’s mule and injury to another mule owned by the plaintiff
by the defendant’s bull)); id. at 545 n.30 (citing Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 LRE & I App.
330 (HL) 338–40 (appeal taken from Eng.) (indicating the reservoir causing the plaintiff’s
damage was constructed by the defendant at his own risk and for his own benefit)).
187. One of Fletcher’s examples, see id. at 570, is a case in which the New York’s Court
of Appeals mentioned, in connection with lasting air pollution arising from a large cement
plant operation, that the law requires it to “decide[] the rights of parties before it” and
not “use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public
objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court,” Boomer v. Atl. Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). Ultimately, however, the court carried out a cost-
benefit analysis and granted the afflicted property owners a liability-rule protection.
Specifically, it granted the injunction sought by the owners “conditioned on the payment
of permanent damages . . . which would compensate them for the total economic loss to
their property” and ruled that the defendant will be able to remove the injunction after
paying the owners “such permanent damages as may be fixed by the court.” Id. at 872–73.
This ruling was a standard application of the nuisance doctrine, which balances private
property interests against social welfare. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 14 (1985) (indicating
nuisance liability is a function of a cost-benefit analysis).
572 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:535
real-world illustrations of the Hand formula feature an accident-prone
activity that produces public benefit.188 The two types of risky activity fall
under two different liability regimes identified here as the private and
the public mechanisms of accident regulation.
The Hand formula defines negligence with greater precision and
more narrowly than the private mechanism of accident regulation and its
fairness and reciprocity standards. By adopting this formula, the public
mechanism of accident regulation narrows the entry into tort liability for
actors who generate public benefits.189 Defendants whose activities
produce no such benefits and consequently fall under the private mecha-
nism face a much broader entry into liability in tort. This difference has
an obvious explanation. The public mechanism narrows victims’ rights in
order not to chill the production of public benefits. The private mecha-
nism, for its part, gives victims more expansive entitlements to safety
because these entitlements do not stop the production of public, as
opposed to private, benefits.
Table 1 below summarizes this legal phenomenon.
Another example brought by Fletcher is air carriers’ strict liability for damages caused
by objects falling from an aircraft. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 570; see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 520A (Am. Law Inst. 1977). This example features a conclusive
presumption of negligence that can be justified on cost-efficiency grounds as well. See
infra note 240.
Fletcher also cites a famous case in which a defendant moored his ship to a private
dock without permission from the dock owner in order to prevent it from being carried
away by a severe storm, ultimately damaging the dock as the storm ran its course. See
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 544 (citing Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221
(Minn. 1910)). The defendant was faultless, but the court nonetheless decided that he
must compensate the dock owner for the damage to the dock. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 221–22.
This decision is beside the point because it awarded the dock owner the standard remedy
for intentional trespass that does not involve balancing of costs and benefits. See Merrill,
supra, at 16. This decision also aligns with tort law’s goal of maximizing social welfare. See
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1823,
1849–52 (2009) (justifying Vincent by the social need to prevent extortionary holdouts and
minimize transaction costs).
188. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 194–95 (illustrating
adoptions of the Hand formula by cases featuring water supply, public transport, and
mining operations).
189. The entry–exit taxonomy originally appeared in the classic analysis of contract
law. See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 47–48 (1974). For its first introduction
into tort theory, see Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 Iowa L. Rev.
1201, 1202–03 (2012) [hereinafter Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice].
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TABLE 1: TWO FACES OF “NEGLIGENCE”
Standard
Public
Regulation
Private
Regulation Goal
Entry into
Liability
Benefit
of
Activity
Public
Hand
Formula
Welfare Narrow
Private
Equality &
Reciprocity
Corrective
Justice
Broad
B. Illustrations
The first and historically most significant illustration of this Article’s
theory is Losee v. Buchanan—a seminal decision of the New York Court of
Appeals.190 This widely cited precedent explicitly separated accident-
prone activities that produce public benefits from activities that produce
no such benefits while creating a risk of harm for other people.191 To
date, scholars have paid virtually no attention to this aspect of Losee. This
section will rectify this omission.
The facts of Losee are remarkable. An industrial steam boiler, owned
and operated by the Saratoga Paper Company at its mill, exploded and
caused massive damage to the neighboring properties.192 The victims
sued the company (and related parties) for tort damages but could not
prove the company’s negligence because there was none.193 The com-
pany could not have done anything to prevent the explosion short of
shutting down the boiler, which was not economically feasible.194 The
victims argued that they nonetheless were entitled to recover compen-
sation from the company pursuant to a then-recent English case—and
presently, a classic casebook decision—Rylands v. Fletcher.195 In that case,
the defendant had excavated a reservoir on his land for the storage of
water for his mill.196 The water burst through old mine shafts and poured
into the neighboring mine that belonged to the plaintiff, rendering the
mine inoperative.197 The defendant had no fault in that accident, which
was not reasonably foreseeable. The plaintiff, however, was even more
190. See 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
191. See id. at 484–85; Prosser, supra note 31, at 409 n.71 (observing Losee “[has] been
extensively followed”).
192. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 476.
193. Id. at 478.
194. Id. at 485 (stating the company was faultless).
195. (1868) 3 LRE & I App. 330 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
196. Id. at 332.
197. Id.
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innocent than the defendant because he did nothing to contribute to the
accident.198 The court consequently ruled in the plaintiff’s favor and the
House of Lords affirmed that ruling.199
The Losee court disagreed with the victims and decided that the com-
pany was not liable.200 On its way to this conclusion, the court reasoned
that Rylands v. Fletcher was “in direct conflict with the law as settled in this
country.”201 American tort law, the court explained, sets up a distinct
negligence standard for imposing tort liability upon defendants whose
accident-prone activities generate public benefits.202 In the court’s words:
[T]he general rules that . . . I must so use my real estate as not
to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of
the social state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals
and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of
mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any
of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not
so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any
damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He
receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in
which he shares, and the right which he has to place the same things
upon his lands.203
This decision marks the shift from the private law standards of reci-
procity and equality to the public mechanism of accident regulation.204
Under the private mechanism, every prospective tort victim has a right
against court rulings that prioritize the actor’s benefit from a risky activity
over her safety interest. This right remains intact even when the objective
market value of the actor’s private benefit is greater than the expected
harm to the victim.205 When it comes to the production of public be-
nefits, however, the victim has no valid claim for enjoining the system
from treating her safety interest as defeasible and contingent upon cost-
benefit trade-offs.206 Public benefits, as the Losee court explained, are part
198. Id. at 338–40 (explaining the defendant, although innocent, was still liable because
he acted at his own peril).
199. Id. at 338–39.
200. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 492–93 (1873).
201. Id. at 487.
202. Id. at 484–85.
203. Id. (emphasis added); see also Beatty v. Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 12 N.W. 332, 334
(Iowa 1882) (“All persons must accept the advantages of . . . [train transportation] with
the dangers and inconveniences which necessarily attend it. The price of progress cannot
be withheld.”).
204. For similar reasoning, see Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882–83
(Neb. 1902).
205. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (explaining balancing costs and
benefits is unfair for strictly private activities).
206. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text (arguing accident-causing activi-
ties producing public goods are judged by balancing social utility against expected harm).
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of “the general good, in which [the victim] shares.”207 The victim cannot
justifiably demand that her safety interest be exempted from trade-offs
that promote the production of public benefits of which she partakes.
This precedent is 144 years old. Yet, it perfectly accords with present-
day doctrine.208 Consider the precedential decision on the so-called
“baseball rule” that the Supreme Court of Missouri delivered in 2014.209
This decision holds that baseball spectators accidentally injured by stray
balls and bats cannot successfully sue clubs or players.210 Such injuries are
not uncommon and can even be fatal,211 but the court estimated that
they could only be prevented at a socially unaffordable cost: ruining the
spectators’ “joy that comes with being close enough to the Great American
Pastime to smell the new-mown grass, to hear the crack of 42 inches of
solid ash meeting a 95-mph fastball, or to watch a diving third baseman
turn a heart-rending triple into a soul-soaring double-play.”212 This em-
phatic statement categorized professional baseball as a valuable public
benefit. Based on this categorization, the court decided that the creation
of risks that are “a necessary and inherent part of the game” can never
be negligent.213 The court also ruled that spectators who enjoy the close
view of the game willfully assume the risk of being hit by stray balls and
bats.214 This primary assumption of risk, the court held, precludes tort
suits against the club and the players.215
The court, however, refused to recognize ancillary baseball-fan enter-
tainment as a “necessary and inherent part of the game.”216 In the case at
207. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 485.
208. The Losee principle also applies in nuisance cases. See Prosser, supra note 31, at
418–22 (explaining production of public benefits often precludes nuisance remedies and
citing cases).
209. Coomer v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 194 (Mo. 2014) (en
banc).
210. Id. (citing Anderson v. Kan. City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. 1950)).
211. See, e.g., Catherine Cloutier, How Often Are Baseball Spectators Injured During
Game Play?, Bos. Globe (June 9, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/
09/how-often-are-baseball-spectators-injured/bVBG1iYz8u0dy1DLGx0cmI/story.html
[http://perma.cc/LB3B-4AXG] (reporting on average thirty balls per game entered the
stands at Fenway Park, the home of the Boston Red Sox, injuring thirty-six to fifty-three
spectators per season during a five-year period in the 1990s); Ed Edmonds, Commentary:
Baseball Needs to Reduce the Risk of Fan Injury, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-baseball-fans-injuries-mlb-bat-line-drive-
ball-perspec-0825-jm-20150824-story.html [http://perma.cc/R9QD-E5FU] (reporting non-
negligible incidences of serious injuries among baseball spectators). See generally Robert
M. Gorman & David Weeks, Death at the Ballpark (2d ed. 2015) (providing an empirical
account of baseball fatalities).
212. Coomer, 437 S.W.3d at 188; see also id. at 196 (discussing a similar observation that
social costs of preventing spectator injuries would be high).
213. Id. at 195.
214. Id. at 194–99.
215. Id. at 194–97.
216. Id. at 195, 197–99.
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bar, Sluggerrr, the Kansas City Royals mascot, used an air gun to shoot
hotdogs to fans. One of those hotdogs struck the plaintiff in his eye,
causing him retinal detachment.217 The court ruled in connection with
this accident that the jury should assess whether Sluggerrr exercised
reasonable care and whether the plaintiff was comparatively negligent
without ascribing any special value to the shooting of hotdogs at the
stadium.218 Under the taxonomy of this Article, this ruling categorized
the benefit from the shooting of hotdogs as private rather than public.219
The oft-cited British decision from Rylands v. Fletcher involved an
application of the private mechanism of accident regulation—quite
possibly, an incorrect one. In that case, the accident-prone activity
carried out by the defendant produced public benefits by facilitating the
mill’s operation. The Exchequer Court and the House of Lords paid no
regard to this factor and proceeded on the assumption that the defen-
dant’s water reservoir benefited only himself.220 The House of Lords
decision consequently created a private law doctrine that imposes strict
liability for damages.221 American courts have generally declined to follow
Rylands in this broad format.222 Instead, they interpreted that decision as
a basis for imposing liability for ultrahazardous activities.223 American
courts also have narrowed the scope of the ultrahazardous-activity
doctrine by effectively confining its application to activities that generate
private benefits.224 Liability imposed by this doctrine is therefore not
genuinely strict: When a pursuer of a private benefit exposes another
person to an unusually severe—and hence nonreciprocal—risk of acci-
dent, she violates that person’s safety for no good reason. Any such
violation has a fault element in it and thus can properly be categorized as
negligence as well.225
217. Id. at 188–89.
218. Id. at 203–04.
219. For cases that similarly emphasize social utility, see Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744
P.2d 43, 49–50 (Colo. 1987) (emphasizing the social utility of not taking precautions as a
key factor in negligence decisions); Broussard v. State, 113 So. 3d 175, 181–86 (La. 2013)
(finding the social utility of elevators justifies greater risk of accident).
220. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 LRE & I App. 330 (HL) 338–40 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (indicating the defendant constructed the reservoir at his own risk and for his own
benefit).
221. Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 78, at 548–51.
222. Id. (noting American courts generally reject Rylands except as authority for
making defendants liable for damages caused by abnormally hazardous activities); cf.
Prosser, supra note 31, at 400, 406–09 (noting only a minority of American courts have
fully adopted Rylands).
223. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 78, at 548–51.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 226–235 (discussing the scope of the ultra-
hazardous-activity doctrine).
225. Here and in all other contexts of American tort law, the negligence–strict liability
divide is “entirely a matter of definition, rather than substance, and the argument leads
only to a pointless dispute over the meaning of a word.” Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 75,
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To see how the ultrahazardous-activity doctrine works, compare the
classic holding of Guille v. Swan,226 which applied the private mechanism,
with Judge Posner’s decision in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co.227 In Guille, the defendant rode a hot air balloon over New
York City and descended into the plaintiff’s garden, from which he was
rescued by spectators who stepped indiscriminately on the plaintiff’s
vegetables and flowers.228 The defendant’s landing involved no negli-
gence on his part—according to the court, he was “at the sport of the
winds”—but the court still found him liable because riding a hot air
balloon over a densely populated urban area was abnormally hazardous.229
This categorization of the defendant’s activity did not match the
plaintiff’s damage, which was relatively minor. Arguably, the defendant’s
benefit from his aerial adventure exceeded the expected damage to the
plaintiff’s vegetables and flowers. The court, however, did not even
consider that possibility. The defendant’s adventure was beneficial only
to himself and produced no offsetting benefits for the society at large.
For that reason, the case was not governed by the public mechanism of
accident regulation and its cost-benefit analysis. Instead, it was controlled
by the private mechanism that made the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s
damage. This liability was well deserved because the defendant exposed
the plaintiff to a nonreciprocal risk of property damage.230
In Indiana Harbor, things were markedly different. This case involved a
spillage of a hazardous chemical from a railroad tank car. The defendant’s
activity—transporting the chemical on a train through the Chicago
metropolitan area—was as risky as riding a hot air balloon above New
York City.231 This activity, however, generated a substantial public benefit
capable of offsetting the risk. To generate this benefit, the activity utilized
the railroad network as a hub-and-spoke system with the city of Chicago
being the hub.232 Based on this factor, Judge Posner refused to categorize
at 536; see also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 209 (“[I]t would be a
mistake to dichotomize negligence and strict liability.”).
226. 19 Johns. 381, 381–82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
227. 916 F.2d 1174, 1177–82 (7th Cir. 1990). For an insightful analysis of this decision,
see generally David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability:
Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (2007)
(arguing Posner “changed the portrayal of strict liability” by introducing the “activity-level
effect”).
228. Guille, 19 Johns. at 381.
229. Id. at 383.
230. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (limiting actors’
liability “to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally
dangerous”).
231. See Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1175.
232. Id. at 1180.
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the activity as abnormally hazardous for purposes of strict liability and
held that the regular negligence rule controlled the case.233
In another decision that applied the ultrahazardous-activity doctrine,
Judge Posner made the public–private benefit distinction unmistakably
clear.234 He wrote:
Keeping a tiger in one’s backyard would be an example of an
abnormally hazardous activity. The hazard is such, relative to
the value of the activity, that we desire not just that the owner
take all due care that the tiger not escape, but that he consider
seriously the possibility of getting rid of the tiger altogether; and
we give him an incentive to consider this course of action by
declining to make the exercise of due care a defense to a suit
based on an injury caused by the tiger—in other words, by
making him strictly liable for any such injury.235
Under this formulation, when a risky activity brings about no
substantial benefits to society, the actor will bear strict liability for any
damage that her activity causes to the victim. The actor’s private benefit
from that activity is immaterial. This benefit, no matter how large,
provides no reason for absolving the actor from the obligation to com-
pensate the victim because the risk she exposes the victim to is nonreci-
procal. Although the actor’s liability for the victim’s damage is technically
strict, her activity is not faultless. Rather, this activity constitutes neg-
ligence because it imposes a nonreciprocal risk of harm on another
person.236
On the other hand, when a hazardous activity benefits society at
large—as in cases involving the production or provision of vital goods,
services, and rescue237—the reciprocity standard and the entire private
mechanism of accident regulation disappear from the scene and the
public mechanism takes over. Under this mechanism, the actor assumes
liability for the victim’s damage only when she fails to take effective
precautions that cost less than the expected damage. When no such
failure is proven to be present, the court will hold the actor not liable
and the victim will receive no compensation. The victim’s compensation,
in the words of the landmark Losee decision, will be “the general good, in
233. Id. at 1181–82.
234. G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 1995).
235. Id.
236. Cf. Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by
Blasting—The Rule of the Future. II, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 667, 672 (1920) (conceptualizing
the ultrahazardous activity rule as imposing liability for the actor’s choice of an abnormally
dangerous activity—identified as “negligence of the first description”—because it is as
wrongful as carrying out a risky activity unaccompanied with adequate precautions against
harm, or “negligence of the second description”).
237. See, e.g., Ind. Consol. Ins. Co. v. Mathew, 402 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (“The law values human life above property.”).
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which [she] shares.”238 Because the victim partakes of public benefits, she
cannot justifiably stall these benefits’ production by demanding that her
safety interest, unlike that of other members of her society, be exempt
from the necessary risk-benefit trade-offs.
The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes this principle.
According to this Restatement, in determining whether an activity falls
into the “abnormally dangerous” category, courts must consider the
“extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.”239 The Restatement gives no recognition to the actor’s private
benefit from the dangerous activity. Moreover, it expressly excludes from
the “abnormally dangerous” category any “activity . . . carried on in
pursuance of a public duty imposed upon the actor as a public officer or
employee or as a common carrier.”240 Remarkably, this exclusion extends
to activities involving explosives that would be considered ultrahazardous
if carried out in pursuit of a private benefit.241
238. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485 (1873).
239. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(f) (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (emphasis
added).
240. Id. § 521. According to the Restatement, air carriers are strictly liable for
“physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground . . . caused by the ascent,
descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft.”
Id. § 520A. This exception to the negligence principle has an explanation that invokes a
conclusive presumption of fault: “The risk of harm to those on the ground is sufficiently
obvious if anything goes wrong with the flight.” Id. § 520A cmt. c; see also Bethel v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1216–18 (N.Y. 1998) (reaffirming the abolition of “the
highest degree of care” standard for common carriers). Courts that still hold common
carriers to the “utmost care” standard do so because common carriers enjoy economies of
scale and access to technologies. See, e.g., Andrews v. United Airlines, 24 F.3d 39, 41 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding in relation to a bag-falling accident that the airline industry’s mode of
operation and access to technologies may impose a duty to prevent such accidents).
241. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 521 cmt. A; see also Toms v. Calvary Assembly of
God, Inc., 132 A.3d 866, 881 (Md. 2016) (declining to categorize licensed public fireworks
as ultrahazardous because “fireworks play an important role in our society, and are often
met with much fanfare . . . [and although] not all segments of the population may enjoy
fireworks displays, . . . the social desirability of fireworks appear to outweigh their
dangerous attributes”); cf. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920-21, amended by 817
P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991) (categorizing unlicensed fireworks as non-beneficial to society
hence ultrahazardous). Compare Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514
(2d Cir. 1931) (“When . . . the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the
perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive for use in his business,
we think there is no justification for relieving it of liability, and that the owner . . . rather
than a third person . . . should bear the loss.”), and Wallace v. A.H. Guion & Co., 117
S.E.2d 359, 360–62 (S.C. 1960) (citing Exner and upholding the same principle), with
Haddon v. Lotito, 161 A.2d 160, 163–64 (Pa. 1960) (holding public fireworks are not
ultrahazardous). For a similar differentiation between public and private benefits generated
by the underlying risky activity, compare Blankenship v. CRT Tree, No. 80907, 2002 WL
31195215, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002) (citing and agreeing with precedents catego-
rizing bungee jumping and bouncing as ultrahazardous), with Hoven v. Kelble, 256
N.W.2d 379, 385–93 (Wis. 1977) (refusing to impose strict liability on providers of medical
care).
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Formulations of negligence in major tort treatises similarly acknow-
ledge the presence of the public–private benefit distinction. For example,
the classic treatise of William Prosser and W. Page Keeton underscores
the centrality of the “social utility” factor in the courts’ applications of
the Hand formula,242 as does the more contemporary treatise of Professor
Dan Dobbs.243 According to these learned treatises, courts routinely
include in the actor’s burden of precautions the social value of a risky
activity that she must forego to avoid an accident.244 Courts allow no such
inclusion for activities that generate a strictly private benefit for the actor
while imposing a risk of harm on another person.245 As already explained,
such activities fall under the private, rather than public, mechanism of
accident regulation. For an actor to be vindicated, such activities therefore
must satisfy the reciprocity or a similar fairness-based standard rather
than the Hand formula’s demand for B ≥ PL.
III. CAUSATION: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
A. Theory
The doctrine of causation consists of two independent requirements:
cause in fact and proximate cause.246 To satisfy the first requirement, the
alleged tort victim must establish as a matter of fact that she would have
suffered no damage if the negligent actor had taken the requisite pre-
cautions against that damage.247 To satisfy the second requirement, the
victim must convince the court that her damage results from the actor’s
negligence as a matter of law.248 To this end, she needs to show that her
damage was among the reasons that made the actor’s conduct negli-
242. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 31, at 171–72 (“Chief among the factors which
must be considered is the social value of the interest which the actor is seeking to
advance . . . . The public interest will justify the use of dangerous machinery, so long as the
benefits outweigh the risk . . . .”).
243. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 144, at 337–40 (2000) [hereinafter Dobbs,
Law of Torts] (stating the social utility of a defendant’s conduct plays a pivotal role in
courts’ determinations of negligence).
244. See id. at 339 & n.11 (reporting courts weigh the utility of a defendant’s conduct
to society to offset a victim’s expected harm, while describing as controversial a similar
setoff of private benefits); Keeton, et al., supra note 8, § 31, at 171–72 (“Against [the]
probability, and gravity, of the risk, must be balanced in every case the utility of the type of
conduct in question.”); see also Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 80 (Cal. 1997)
(underscoring social utility as a core factor that can justify accident-causing activities).
245. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 144, at 339 & n.11 (stating, under
negligence doctrine, private benefit generally does not justify damaging another person).
246. Id. § 167, at 407–09.
247. Id. § 168, at 409–10.
248. Id. § 182, at 448–50.
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gent.249 The victim’s damage thus must fall within the scope of the risk
created by the actor’s negligent conduct.250
Similar to negligence, each of those requirements has a dual meaning
determined, respectively, by the private and public mechanisms of accident
regulation. Tort scholars paid hitherto scant attention to this duality.251
This Part aims to fill this gap. The proceeding discussion focuses on the
core doctrine of causation without considering causality-based defenses
known as comparative fault,252 contributory negligence,253 and avoidable
consequences.254 These defenses become available to negligent actors who
can show that the victim’s damage was wholly or partially self-inflicted.255
Under such circumstances, the actor becomes entitled to reduce her
compensation obligation to the victim by the amount of damage that the
victim negligently brought upon herself.256 These defenses operate in
roughly the same way under both private and public mechanisms of
accident regulation. Other defenses that negligent actors can invoke are
based on the victim’s consent to the risk of accident257 or waiver of the
right to sue the actor in tort.258 These defenses occupy the contract–tort
interface analyzed below in Part V.
1. Cause in Fact. — The cause-in-fact requirement is a core compo-
nent of corrective justice promoted by the private accident-regulation
mechanism. To have a justified recourse to the actor’s money and assets,
the alleged victim must establish that she was wronged by that actor.259
More precisely, the victim must prove that but for the wrong perpetrated
by the actor she would not have been damaged.260 Proof of “but-for”
249. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29
(Am. Law Inst. 2005) (“An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the
risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
250. Id. § 30 (“An actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s
conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.”).
251. For one salient exception, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 860 (1984)
(proposing introduction of probabilistic recovery and class actions for cases involving
mass-exposure accidents).
252. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 201, at 503–04.
253. See id. § 199, at 494–96.
254. See id. § 203, at 510–11.
255. See id. § 202, at 508–10 (stating comparative fault is one factor in the determi-
nation of causation).
256. For the fault–causality criteria permitting the requisite reduction of compensa-
tion, see id. §§ 202–203, at 508–11.
257. Id. § 211, at 534–35 (outlining the assumption of risk defense).
258. Id. §§ 213–214, at 541–46 (outlining rules regulating express and implied agree-
ments not to sue).
259. See supra notes 140–141 (citing sources to illustrate the wrongfulness standard
under corrective justice).
260. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, §§ 168–169, at 409–12 (outlining the
but-for test for causation). Courts also follow the NESS standard articulated by Professor
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causation is necessary for a simple reason: When the actor’s misdeed
causes the alleged victim no harm, the actor does no wrong to that specific
person. Even when the actor acts negligently against that person’s interest,
the person would turn into a real victim only when she actually suffers
damage from that negligence.261 When the actor’s negligence has no bad
consequences for the prospective victim, it is inconsequential. The fact
that the person was merely lucky to stay out of harm’s way is inconse-
quential as well. Under the private mechanism of accident regulation,
the prospective victim’s luck benefits the actor as well.
The public mechanism of accident regulation treats the cause-in-fact
requirement differently. This mechanism ascribes no intrinsic value to
the wrongs, the rights, and the remedies that define the second-personal
relationship between the actor and the victim. Instead, it cares about
motivating actors to take cost-efficient precautions against harm and
eliminating chilling effects on the production of public benefits.262 These
ex ante incentives do not depend on the factual accuracy of the causal
attribution of the victim’s damage to the actor’s misdeed.263 To set these
incentives right, all the tort system needs to do is design a reliable proxy
that will connect the actor’s conduct to the relevant risk of harm and
identify the most efficient enforcer of the requisite safety standard. Based
on that proxy, the system can separate cases in which it will respond to
the standard’s violation from cases in which it will forego the standard’s
enforcement.264
An alternative to this damage-focused enforcement strategy is ex
ante regulation of accident risks. As Professor Steven Shavell explains in
his recent article, however, ex ante regulation of risks often requires
costly monitoring.265 Shavell’s prime example is the regulation obligating
restaurants to have a functioning fire sprinkler system. He shows that the
duty to have a functioning fire sprinkler system in a restaurant is best
enforced through a system of torts and not by ex ante regulation. The
reason is simple: Inspecting each and every eating establishment to
Richard Wright. See Wright, Causation in Tort Law, supra note 141, at 1774; see also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 26 (Am. Law Inst.
2005) (categorizing tortious conduct as a factual cause of harm in all cases in which “the
harm would not have occurred absent the conduct”); id. § 27 (stating multiple acts “each
of which . . . alone would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time
in the absence of the other act(s)” will also satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement). Under
both NESS and “multiple sufficient causes” scenarios, the defendant’s conduct constitutes
cause in fact because it ensures that the plaintiff sustains injury.
261. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
262. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 78–84 (1975) [hereinafter Calabresi, Concerning Cause].
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence
Rule over Regulation, 42 J. Legal Stud. 275, 284–85 (2013).
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ensure that it has an operating sprinkler system is just too costly. A far
more expedient strategy is to carry out a post-fire inspection of the
restaurant as part of the tort action.266 Private enforcement via tort suits
will only target those restaurants that caught on fire—a much smaller
number than that of all restaurants in the relevant locality.267 Further-
more, the right to force this inspection on a restaurant will be bestowed
on the individual victim. The victim will also be given an incentive to
enforce the safety standard. If she proves that the restaurant had no
functioning fire sprinkler system, she would receive a court verdict
ordering the restaurant to compensate her for her damage.
Under the public regulation mechanism, the court will grant the
victim recovery even when she cannot prove that the restaurant could
have extinguished the fire if it had employed a good sprinkler system. All
the victim needs to show is that such a scenario was a real possibility or, in
the legal jargon, that the absence of a functioning sprinkler system at the
restaurant “substantially” or “materially” contributed to the fire acci-
dent.268 When the victim’s evidence meets the requisite “substantial factor”
threshold, the court will obligate the restaurant to compensate her for
her entire damage.269 The victim need not prove that, but for the restau-
rant’s failure to have working sprinklers in place, she would have stayed
out of harm’s way.270 This demanding proof requirement belongs only to
the private, as opposed to the public, mechanism of accident regulation.
The public mechanism uses these rules to narrow the causality-based
exit from liability for negligent actors. To achieve the same result, the
mechanism sometimes reverses the burden of proof by requiring the
negligent actor to produce evidence that credibly disassociates her
266. Id. at 278–82.
267. Id. at 281–82.
268. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 41, at 267 (stating the “substantial factor”
standard “has found general acceptance”).
269. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 173, at 420–21 (observing “[c]ourts
are avowedly liberal” with the proof of causation when the defendant is shown to have
violated an industry’s safety standard that guards against “the kind of harm suffered by the
plaintiff” and citing cases involving pharmaceutical negligence and ill maintenance of
residential buildings and public amenities). Such determinations of cause in fact were
anticipated by Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 72–75, 94–
97 (1956).
270. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 173, at 421 (describing inferences of
but-for causation). For salient illustrations of this approach, see Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625
So. 2d 1002, 1003, 1005–06 (La. 1993) (allowing the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard to override the more stringent but-for test for cause in fact in the presence of
multiple causal factors that included the defendant’s negligence); Bostic v. Ga.-Pac. Corp.,
439 S.W.3d 332, 344 (Tex. 2014) (“While but for causation is a core concept in tort law, it
yields to the more general substantial factor causation in situations where proof of but for
causation is not practically possible . . . .”).
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wrongdoing from the victim’s damage.271 In cases involving medical
malpractice or a mass accident, courts also may grant the victim com-
pensation that reflects the probability of her causal allegations against
the wrongdoer.272 Actors consequently should expect to pay their victims
compensation whenever they fail to implement precautions commen-
surate with the victim’s expected damage.
The private mechanism does not penalize negligent actors in the
same way except when they also create causal uncertainty (for example,
by destroying evidence critical to their victims’ suit).273 At the same time,
the entry into tort liability set by the private mechanism for negligent
actors is much broader than the public mechanism’s Hand formula.274
Table 2 below summarizes these two cause-in-fact requirements and
their respective roles in the system of torts.
TABLE 2: TWO FACES OF “CAUSE IN FACT”
Standard
Public Regulation Private Regulation Exit from Liability
Benefit
of
Activity
Public
Substantial Factor;
Probabilistic
Recovery;
Reversed Burden
of Proof
Narrow
Private But-for / NESS Broad
271. See, e.g., Transorient Navigators Co. v. M/S Southwind, 714 F.2d 1358, 1368–69
(5th Cir. 1983) (holding a violation of a sailing rule to be the reason for presuming that
the violator caused the subsequent collision of vessels). For additional examples, see
Kenneth S. Abraham, Self-Proving Causation, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1811, 1838–42 (2013). For a
novel explanation of “relaxed causation” rules that apply to group activities, see generally
J. Shahar Dillbary, Causation Actually, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2016) (showing that relaxed
causation induces cost-efficient infliction of indivisible harm by multiple tortfeasors who
split the obligation to compensate the victim).
272. See supra note 133 (citing cases to illustrate the use of statistics and probabilistic
recovery theory in medical malpractice suits).
273. For an early precedent establishing this principle, see Allison v. Chandler, 11
Mich. 542, 554 (1863) (“The nature of the case is such that the wrong-doer has chosen to
make it; and upon every principle of justice, he is the party who should be made to sustain
all the risk of loss which may arise from the uncertainty . . . result[ing from] his own
wrongful act.”); see also Porat & Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, supra note 133, at
169–70 (arguing penalizing tort defendants for causing evidential damage is consistent
with corrective justice); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causal Uncertainty, 36 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
135, 142–46 (2016) (explaining corrective justice protects victims’ remedial right to esta-
blish liability for wrongful injury).
274. See supra section II.A (discussing the distinction between the public and private
definitions of negligence).
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The cause-in-fact requirement thus has two meanings. Yet, as with
negligence, this duality does not establish that causation doctrine is
unintelligible. The two different meanings, or faces, of “cause in fact”
belong to two different liability regimes identified here as public and
private mechanisms of accident regulation. The private mechanism applies
only to accident-prone activities that produce private benefits, while the
public mechanism of accident regulation controls accident-prone acti-
vities that generate public benefits. Hence, there is no real conflict
between these two visions of cause in fact. Their simultaneous presence
in our tort system does not make the system unprincipled, incoherent, or
incomprehensible.
The private regulation of accidents geared toward attaining
corrective justice, however, does not unexceptionally adhere to the rigid
but-for standard. When a negligent actor destroys evidence that could
help the victim prove causation, the private mechanism may reverse the
burden of proof and hold the actor causally responsible for the victim’s
damage unless she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that she
did not cause that damage.275 The private mechanism may also substitute
the but-for standard with more flexible, as well as more plaintiff-friendly,
criteria for cause in fact: “substantial factor” and even “probabilistic
recovery.” These substitutions may occur when the victim sustains proba-
bilistic or actuarial harm that negatively affects her life: for example,
when she experiences a substantial decrease in her chances to recover
from illness, or when her chances to become seriously ill in the future
substantially increase.276
2. Proximate Cause. — The classic formulation of the proximate cause
requirement hews to corrective justice and positions itself within the
private mechanism of accident regulation. Under this formulation, a tort
victim can recover compensation only for the harms she was entitled to
be protected against by the actor.277 The victim’s harm must be among
the reasons that make the actor’s conduct negligent.278 Put differently,
275. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Cal. 1948) (holding when the individual
cause of the victim’s injury is unproven but evidence shows two or more actors acted
carelessly and one of them caused the injury, it is incumbent on each actor to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not cause the injury). This rule originates from
Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (KB); 1 Str. 505; see e.g., Goodman v.
Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517 n.12 (D. Md. 2009) (summarizing the spo-
liation doctrine and tracing it to Armory v. Delamirie).
276. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 439, 462–73 (1990) (asserting liability for increasing risk of harm
for another person is compatible with corrective justice). But see Stephen R. Perry, Risk,
Harm, and Responsibility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, supra note 11, at 321,
336 (explaining a deterministic view of causes and effects rejects the notion of risk damage).
277. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29
(Am. Law Inst. 2005).
278. Id.
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the victim’s right and the actor’s wrong must be exact Hohfeldian
correlatives; the right must define the wrong.279 The duty of care that the
actor owed to the victim consequently must include an obligation to
prevent or avoid the damage sustained by the victim.280 Then, when the
actor defaults on that harm-specific obligation and causes the victim
damage she was entitled to be protected against, the actor becomes liable
in tort and must pay the victim for her damage.281
The Third Restatement of Torts provides a classic illustration of
these rules:
Richard, a hunter, finishes his day in the field and stops at a
friend’s house while walking home. His friend’s nine-year-old
daughter, Kim, greets Richard, who hands his loaded shotgun
to her as he enters the house. Kim drops the shotgun, which
lands on her toe, breaking it.282
In this hypothetical case, Kim’s entitlement to Richard’s precautions is
limited in scope: It encompasses Kim’s protection against shooting
injuries and nothing else.283 Consequently, Kim has no right to obligate
Richard to protect her toe against falling objects. For his part, Richard, of
course, could protect Kim’s toe at no extra cost to himself since he
already had a duty not to hand his shotgun to her. This fact, however, is
merely accidental and inconsequential for corrective justice.
Under the public mechanism, things could change rather dramati-
cally. This mechanism obligates actors to internalize all the costs and,
correspondingly, all the risks created by their conduct. This obligation is
subject to the Hand formula, which creates an exception to the internali-
zation rule by allowing actors not to take precautions that cost more than
the expected harm.284 Richard, however, could not take advantage of that
exception. All he could do is make a plausible argument that the harm to
Kim’s toe called for no precautions whatsoever because it was remote and
improbable, on top of not being very serious. This argument, however, is
doomed to fail because the expected harm to Kim’s toe was above $0,
279. See Hohfeld, supra note 80, at 28–32 (explaining the correlativity of rights,
wrongs, and remedies).
280. Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 182, at 449–50 (explaining the co-
dependency of proximate cause and duty of care).
281. See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 Yale L.J. 82, 84–85 (2011); see
also Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, supra note 11, at 346 (arguing a victim’s damage should
be actionable only when it falls “within the scope of the risks that make that aspect of [the
defendant’s] conduct at fault”); Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 159 (“The
consequences for which the defendant is liable are restricted to those within the risks that
render the act wrongful in the first place.”).
282. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. d,
illus. 3.
283. Id.
284. See supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
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while Richard’s marginal cost of preventing it equaled $0. Hence, B <
PL.285
This discrepancy should not come as a surprise. Protecting rights
and inducing cost-efficient conduct are two different missions of the law
of torts. Those missions are equally important, but they also differ from
each other conceptually and operationally.286 The Restatement’s view that
Richard should assume no liability for Kim’s injury represents the private
mechanism of accident regulation that focuses on the protection of
rights. This view presents a perfectly correct statement of the law, and
here is why: Richard’s activity (handing his gun over to Kim) generated a
strictly private benefit (Richard’s convenience) and no benefits for the
society as a whole. This factor widens Richard’s entry into negligence, but
at the same time it also widens his causality-based exit from liability.
With this in mind, consider the operation of the proximate cause
requirement under the public mechanism of accident regulation.
Consider the following case:
An obstetrician negligently fails to notice that the patient’s fetus
is oversized—which requires a C-section delivery—and delivers
the baby naturally. A knot of the umbilical cord that had no
prior indications asphyxiated the baby, and the baby died. The
umbilical cord problem was completely unforeseeable, yet a C-
section would have saved the baby’s life. Is the obstetrician
liable?287
This case appears to be identical to the hypothetical case of Kim v.
Richard,288 but it is not. In Kim v. Richard, the benefit produced by the
defendant’s accident-prone activity was private. In the present case, the
benefit was public because it included baby delivery and neonatal care.
Correspondingly, the court should decide the proximate cause issue by
applying the public mechanism of accident regulation.
The public mechanism narrows the scope of negligence and the
entry into tort liability for actors such as doctors, nurses, and hospitals,
who produce public benefits.289 Such an actor can only be liable when
she causes harm to another person by failing to take precautions against
the risk she is responsible for when those precautions cost less than the
expected harm.290 Our tort system put this economic limitation in place
285. See Porat, supra note 281, at 126 n.127 (arguing the risk to the child’s toe should
be accounted for in the negligence determination).
286. See Posner, Concept of Corrective Justice, supra note 10, at 201–06 (discussing
the tension between individual rights and social welfare in tort law).
287. This hypothetical originates from the Israel Supreme Court decision in CA
2714/02 Doe v. Bnei Zion (Haifa) Med. Ctr. 58(1) PD 516 (2003).
288. See supra text accompanying note 282.
289. See supra section II.A (observing cost-benefit analysis is applied in identifying
negligence in activities that generate public benefits).
290. See supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text (explaining the Hand formula).
588 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:535
in order not to discourage the production of public benefits. With “proxi-
mate cause,” the public mechanism does the exact opposite: It expands
the scope of the risk for which negligent actors are responsible in order
to narrow their exit from liability and make them pay for damages that
they fail to prevent whenever the expected damage is costlier than the
prevention or avoidance of the accident.291 As demonstrated in section
III.A.1, the mechanism interprets the cause-in-fact requirement to pro-
duce the same effect.
Under this mechanism, when applicable medical standards require a
doctor to deliver a patient’s baby by a C-section, the doctor ought to
make sure that the patient gets all the benefits from having the baby
delivered sooner (by a C-section) rather than later (vaginally). These
benefits include the patient’s opportunity to resolve unanticipated—yet,
not altogether improbable—crisis situations similar to the umbilical cord
emergency that ended up in a tragedy in the case at bar. Hence, because
the obstetrician was already obligated to carry out a C-section, her margi-
nal cost of saving the baby’s life was $0. For the same medical reason, the
patient faced no additional pain or risks either. The expected gain, on
the other hand, was well above $0: It equaled the very low ex ante proba-
bility of the umbilical cord accident multiplied by the value of the baby’s
life. The welfare-driven economic analysis consequently identifies the
obstetrician’s malpractice as the proximate cause of the baby’s death.
Table 3 summarizes the two proximate cause requirements—private
and public—and their respective roles in our system of torts.
TABLE 3: TWO FACES OF “PROXIMATE CAUSE”
Standard
Public Regulation Private Regulation Exit from Liability
Benefit
of
Activity
Public Cost-Benefit
Analysis
Narrow
Private Damage Tracks
Duty
Broad
As Table 3 demonstrates, the private mechanism of accident regu-
lation focuses exclusively on the victim’s safety rights and on the actor’s
correlative duty to respect these rights. The public mechanism, in contrast,
cares about keeping accident risks at a socially optimal level, and for that
reason it requires actors to eliminate every risk that can be prevented at
291. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1203–07 (unveiling
the entry–exit design of medical malpractice laws across the United States).
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an economically justified cost. Conceptually, both mechanisms carry out
the “scope of the risk” analysis, but they perform that analysis in two
different ways. The private mechanism defines “scope of the risk” by a
Hohfeldian derivation of the victim’s right to receive protection against
accidental harm from the actor’s duty of care.292 The public mechanism,
for its part, defines “scope of the risk” as including every risk that the
actor could prevent by taking precautions that cost less than the total
expected damage. This definition narrows the exit from liability for neg-
ligent actors.
B. Illustrations
Consider a Virginia Supreme Court decision featuring a married
couple, Lena and John, and the doctrine of cause in fact.293 A miscom-
munication between Lena and John, who together had driven to a
friend’s house, caused Lena to believe that John left the friend’s house
and walked home.294 In fact, John was squatting behind the couple’s car,
waiting for Lena to come out and drive him home.295 After leaving the
friend’s house, Lena entered the car, started the engine, backed up with-
out looking in the rearview mirror, and ran over John.296 In the ensuing
suit for damages, it was established that Lena’s failure to look in the rear-
view mirror while driving her car backwards constituted negligence.297
However, the court also determined that “her looking in the rearview
mirror would not have detected [John’s] presence.”298 As a result, John
was unable to prove that but for Lena’s negligent driving, he would not
have been injured and lost the case.299
This case was properly decided under the private mechanism of
accident regulation.300 By contrast, when a similar accident falls under
the public mechanism, the actor might find herself liable. For example,
courts normally impose liability on a physician who mistreats a terminal
patient by negligently failing to diagnose the presence of a malignant
brain tumor, from which the patient was about to die.301 The fact that the
292. See Hohfeld, supra note 80, at 30–32 (theorizing that one’s having a right entails
the other party’s owing a correlative duty).
293. See Jordan v. Jordan, 257 S.E.2d 761 (Va. 1979).
294. Id. at 762–63.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 763.
300. See supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text (explaining but-for causation
under the private mechanism).
301. See, e.g., Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 330–31 (Mo. 2016).
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patient was doomed to die soon after receiving proper treatment is not a
defense.302
Consider the Utah Supreme Court decision in Alder v. Bayer Corp.303
that applied the cause-in-fact doctrine in a case involving a manufac-
turer’s negligent installation and servicing of an x-ray machine at a
hospital.304 The manufacturer’s negligence included failure to secure
ventilation that could drive away chemical fumes coming from the
machine.305 Shortly after the machine’s installation, two technicians who
operated it developed chronic fatigue and other symptoms.306 They sued
to recover for that harm, but the trial court ruled that their causation
evidence was not sufficient to move the case to the jury.307 The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed.308 It held that the safety protocol that the
manufacturer violated aimed at preventing the type of harm suffered by
the technicians.309 Under such circumstances, it explained, temporal
proximity between the harm and the violation can properly substitute for
causation evidence.310 This ruling continues an established common law
practice to narrow the exit from liability for providers of goods and
services who violate safety regulations and standards.311
The final example features a landmark decision delivered by Judge
Calabresi on behalf of the Second Circuit in Zuchowicz v. United States.312
As a result of pharmaceutical or physician negligence, a naval hospital
patient overdosed on the drug Danocrine, developed a rare and fatal
pulmonary illness, and passed away.313 Her husband filed a suit against
the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act and applicable
Connecticut law.314 The absence of medical data prevented the plaintiff
from establishing the requisite but-for causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.315 The trial court nonetheless decided the case in his favor
302. Id. at 331 (“This approach keeps the question of the time and date of the
decedent’s death out of the causation analysis and confines it to the damages analysis
where it belongs.”).
303. 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002).
304. Id. at 1071.
305. Id. at 1072.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1071.
308. Id. at 1089.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1089–90.
311. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 41, at 270 (explaining that in cases involving
“violation of some statutory safety regulation . . . the court [cannot] overlook the fact that
the injury . . . is precisely the sort of thing that proper care . . . intended to prevent” and
“accordingly allow a certain liberality” in jury decisionmaking).
312. 140 F.3d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998).
313. Id. at 384–85.
314. Id. at 383, 387–89.
315. Id. at 389.
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by relying on an expert opinion that identified the overdose of Danocrine
as comparatively the most probable cause of the patient’s fatal illness.316
Based on the expert’s differential etiology analysis,317 the court deter-
mined that the probability that the patient died from that overdose
exceeded the probability of all other known hypotheses.318
Judge Calabresi affirmed this determination.319 He held that the
expert’s testimony alone was good enough to satisfy the requisite cause-in-
fact requirement.320 The legal basis for that holding was the oft-neglected
—yet critical—doctrinal nexus between statutory and professional safety
standards and the two pillars of the causation doctrine: cause in fact and
proximate cause. According to Judge Calabresi, when the plaintiff proves
that the defendant violated a statutory, professional, or other well-
articulated safety standard—labeled by Prosser “a plain common law duty
of care”321—and when the victim’s injury falls within the scope of the risk
aimed to be eliminated or reduced by that standard, the plaintiff needs
only a scintilla of evidence to establish cause in fact.322 The plaintiff need
not satisfy the strict but-for standard, nor does she even need to prove
cause in fact by a preponderance of the evidence.323 As Judge Calabresi
explains, “[a]t one time, courts were reluctant to say in such circum-
stances that the wrong could be deemed to be the cause,” but “[a]ll that
has changed.”324
The changes that Judge Calabresi had in mind are profound and go
beyond the rule he formulated in Zuchowicz.325 Under extant law, victims
of medical malpractice can prove causation by a “reasonable medical
probability” instead of preponderance of the evidence.326 In the medical
malpractice area, state courts increasingly adopt the probabilistic reco-
very doctrine that entitles victims to receive fractional compensation that
equals the full amount of the victim’s harm multiplied by the patient’s
lost chances to recover from illness.327
Move now to the proximate cause doctrine. Under this doctrine,
harm inflicted on the victim by a negligent party’s action must be among
316. Id. at 385–86, 389–90.
317. Id. at 385–86.
318. Id. at 383.
319. Id. at 389–90.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 391 (quoting Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 41, at 270).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 390.
325. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 262, at 71–73 (articulating a public
law paradigm of causation standards geared toward augmentation of social welfare).
326. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1218–22 (citing
cases in which courts relaxed causation requirements in medical malpractice cases).
327. Id. at 1225–26; see also supra note 133 (citing cases).
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the reasons that make the action negligent.328 If it is not among those
reasons, the court will deny the victim compensation for that harm.329
The victim’s harm consequently must track the duty to take precautions
that the actor violated. This connection between duty and proximate
cause stands at the crossroads between the private and the public mecha-
nisms of accident regulation.
Courts that apply the private mechanism tend to interpret this
connection differently from courts using the public mechanism. Under
the private mechanism, the actor’s duty of care is coextensive with
foreseeability of the victim, the harm, and the circumstances of the
accident.330 Ordinary people are not supposed to take care of unfore-
seeable accidents, unforeseeable victims, and unforeseeable harms.331
Courts, however, have increasingly come to realize that producers of
public benefits—who enjoy the narrow definition of negligence under
the Hand formula and its conceptual equivalents—have gone a long way
to separate themselves from the proverbial “reasonable man on the
Clapham omnibus.”332 These actors are predominantly corporations and
skilled professionals whose performance should track their competitive
industries’ state of the art.333 The scope of the risk that these actors
should be responsible for is not unlimited. The railway companies’ duties
of care still do not include the prevention of outlandish scenarios, akin
to Helen Palsgraf’s injury from the scales that fell upon her due to the
blast from the explosives that a passenger dropped on the ground after
being negligently pushed by the railroad employees into a moving train.334
This scope, however, includes more risks than the private mechanism’s
concept of foreseeability can plausibly encompass.
Medical malpractice, once again, is a case in point. In 2013, the
Georgia Court of Appeals decided a tragic case that involved an elderly
patient with an arthritic knee.335 The patient’s doctors injected that knee
with a medication drawn from a contaminated multidose vial.336 As a
result, the patient developed excruciating pain in her knee and became
328. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29 (Am.
Law Inst. 2005).
329. Id. § 30.
330. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 65.
331. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 187, at 463 (explaining the general
foreseeability standard as limiting actors’ liability to harms that “a reasonable and prudent
person would seek to avoid”).
332. See Percy H. Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 112, 126 (1931)
(mentioning a “negligence” definition that refers to “how the man on the Clapham
omnibus would act in the common affairs of life”).
333. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 32, at 185–87.
334. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
335. Ga. Clinic v. Stout, 747 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
336. Id. at 87.
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severely depressed.337 The doctors treated her for the pain in the knee
but neglected the depression.338 After a short period of time, the patient
committed suicide by jumping from the window of her fourteenth-floor
apartment.339 She left behind a suicide note saying that she could not
take her pain anymore and preferred to die.340 The patient’s estate won
the wrongful-death action against the doctors and was awarded, on top of
compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount of $2,500,000.341
The court of appeals affirmed this verdict.342 With regard to the
proximate cause issue, the court held that the testimony of a psychiatric
expert, citing studies that connect suicide to severe pain and untreated
depression, allowed the jury to include the patient’s depression and
suicide among the risks to which orthopedic doctors should attend.343
IV. DAMAGE: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
A. Theory
The concept of “damage” used by our tort system has two different
meanings that resonate with the dual understanding of “negligence” and
“causation.” One of these meanings is factual and the other constructive
or legal. The factual meaning refers to the actual damage that the actor
inflicted on the victim by acting negligently against the victim’s protected
safety interest. The constructive meaning represents the damage amount
that the tort system obligates the actor to pay on policy grounds when the
victim’s actual damage is below or above the imputed amount.344
Our tort system uses these two meanings to promote different goals.
The factual meaning is a core element of the private mechanism of
accident regulation that promotes fairness and corrective justice. Correc-
tive justice requires that the actor pay the victim compensation that
equals the damage inflicted on that victim.345 This payment reinstates the
victim’s right and eradicates the actor’s wrong. Forcing the actor to pay
more is unfair to the actor. Allowing the actor to pay less is unfair to the
victim.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 88.
342. Id. at 91.
343. Id.
344. See infra section IV.B (discussing cases in which tort law adjusts remedies in
accordance with the social utility of the underlying activities).
345. See Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 44, at 117 (noting corrective justice requires
tortfeasors to pay victims for their factual losses, which represent “the shortfall from one’s
due”).
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The constructive meaning, on the other hand, belongs to the public
mechanism of accident regulation. This mechanism increases and reduces
the compensation amounts payable by negligent actors in tune with the
underlying public interest.346 To strengthen actors’ incentive to imple-
ment safety measures, the mechanism increases the compensation duty
for those actors.347 When actors’ liability for accidental damages moti-
vates them to reduce or altogether abandon the production of public
benefits, the mechanism reduces their compensation duty relative to
their victims’ actual harm.348 These two policy tools are functional equi-
valents of taxes and subsidies. The public mechanism uses these tools to
counteract, interchangeably, underenforcement and overenforcement of
the law. When neither underenforcement nor overenforcement is pre-
sent, making actors pay victims for their actual damages sets the right
incentive for actors’ precautionary measures against accidents. The public
mechanism then imposes on negligent actors the same compensation
duty as the private mechanism.
The factual approach to damages makes the compensation amount
equal to the objective value of the victim’s asset that the negligent actor
damaged or destroyed. This asset can be anything that has value, in-
cluding the victim’s life, bodily integrity, health, property, business, and
mental and emotional well-being.349 The monetary equivalent of the
damage to, or destruction of, the asset is the cost of repair or replace-
ment.350 Courts can determine that cost by combining relevant evidence
with their general understanding of the world.351
Under the constructive approach, the monetary equivalent of the
damaged or destroyed asset serves only as a baseline, or a default amount,
for the court’s decision. As already explained, the constructive approach
gives courts the power to increase this amount as they deem necessary for
counteracting the underenforcement of the law and the resulting
shortfall in deterrence or, alternatively, for mitigating the overenforce-
ment of the law and its chilling effect on socially beneficial activities.
Critically, underenforcement of the law may play into the hands of two
types of actors: actors whose accident-prone activities are self-serving and
346. See infra section IV.B (illustrating the effect of the public mechanism on tort
compensation).
347. For a classic account of damage multipliers, see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998)
(developing efficiency-based criteria for imposing and calculating punitive damages).
348. This policy explains statutory caps on damages payable by government agencies
and providers of medical care. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 384, at 1071–72.
349. Id. § 377, at 1047–53; see also Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49
(2016) (defining harm for standing purposes as including tangible and intangible damages).
350. See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 5.13(1),
at 835–36 (2d ed. 1993) (outlining damage assessment methods based on fair-market,
replacement, and intrinsic values of damaged or destroyed assets).
351. See id.
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generate no public benefits whatsoever and actors who produce public
benefits. When underenforcement is systemic and negligent actors go
scot-free, the compromised safety becomes a public problem. The dis-
tinction between the two types of accident-prone activities thus becomes
inconsequential. The tort system consequently switches from the private
to the public mechanism of accident regulation.352
These dynamics are summarized in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4: TWO FACES OF “DAMAGE”
Standard
Public Regulation Private Regulation
Types of
Activities
Activities Producing
Public Benefit
Incentive for Socially
Beneficial Conduct
(Constructive or
Imputed Damage)
Activities Producing
Private Benefit
Infringed Entitlement
(Actual Damage)
Activities Subject to
Systematic
Underenforcement
Incentive for Socially
Beneficial Conduct
(Constructive or
Imputed Damage)
B. Illustrations
The most obvious illustration of this theory is the cap on damages
that courts can award tort victims. Lawmakers set those caps to minimize
the chilling effect on accident-prone activities that produce public bene-
fits.353 The prospect of paying victims high amounts of compensation may
make it rational for actors to steer away from those activities, albeit to
society’s detriment. For example, an obstetrician facing the prospect of
paying millions of dollars in compensation for newborns’ neurological
injuries may decide to limit her practice to gynecology. Unsurprisingly,
caps on tort victims’ damages are prevalent in the area of medical
malpractice.354
Among the many cases in which courts have increased actors’ com-
pensation duty in order to remedy shortfalls in deterrence, Mathias v.
352. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159–63 (Wis. 1997)
(stating and applying the principle that punitive damages should be awarded to counter
underenforcement in private trespass cases).
353. See, e.g., Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1253–54 (dis-
cussing statutory limits on doctors’ and hospitals’ financial responsibility for malpractice).
354. See infra notes 417–424 and accompanying text.
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Accor Economy Lodging stands out as most remarkable.355 The plaintiffs, a
brother and sister, were bitten by bedbugs while staying at the defendants’
motel. The defendants knew about the bedbug infestation, but they did
nothing to fix the problem and concealed it from the guests.356 The jury
awarded each of the two plaintiffs $5,000 in compensatory damages and
$186,000 in punitive damages.357 The Seventh Circuit decision, delivered
by Judge Posner, affirmed this award of punitive damages.358 Judge
Posner’s decision relied on an exception to the Supreme Court’s consti-
tutional limitation on punitive damages and used simple economic
logic.359 Motel guests other than the two plaintiffs were unlikely to sue
the defendant because of opportunity costs and high litigation expenses.
The motel had 191 rooms—a factor that aligned with the total compen-
sation amount of $191,000 the jury awarded each plaintiff.360 The jury’s
verdict thus made the defendant pay an entirely reasonable penalty of
$2,000 per room. This penalty roughly matched the damage that the
defendant caused.361 Having the defendant pay a lesser amount would
have diluted the deterrence effect on similarly situated actors in the hotel
industry.362
Because this decision dealt with the hotel industry, which produces
public benefits, it properly applied the public mechanism of accident
regulation. This mechanism calls for aligning the defendant’s compen-
sation duty with the full amount of damage it recklessly caused. Allowing
the defendant to pay a lesser amount runs afoul of our tort system’s
deterrence policies.
355. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
356. Id. at 673–75.
357. Id. at 674.
358. Id. at 678.
359. Id. at 675–77. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the
Supreme Court held that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process” and that “four
times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety.” 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). The exception invoked by Posner, see Mathias, 347
F.3d at 675–76, was designed for cases in which “‘a particularly egregious act has resulted
in only a small amount of economic damages,’” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (quoting BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
360. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678.
361. Id.
362. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 347, at 887–96 (explaining that, in order to
make tortfeasors internalize damage, courts should multiply plaintiff’s actual damage by
the reciprocal of the probability of law enforcement). But see Steven Shavell, On the
Proper Magnitude of Punitive Damages: Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 120 Harv.
L. Rev. 1223, 1226–27 (2007) (noting that when a wrongdoer damages clients, as opposed
to third parties, punitive damages may be unnecessary because unhappy clients can ruin
the wrongdoer’s reputation).
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A second illustration is provided by the common law “collateral
source” rule363 and its statutory abolitions.364 The collateral source rule
holds that a wrongdoer cannot benefit from payments for the victim’s
damage made by outside sources such as insurance companies, govern-
ment agencies, and private donors.365 Such payments belong to the victim
alone.366 Whether the victim made a subrogation agreement with the
payer that enables that person or organization to recover her compensa-
tion from the actor is of no consequence.367 This rule belongs to the
private mechanism of accident regulation that confines its operation to
the bilateral relationship between the victim and the actor.368
The public mechanism works differently. To prevent chilling effects
on activities that produce public benefits, this mechanism often allows
actors to reduce their compensation duty by the payments that the victim
receives from outside sources. Many states have legislated statutes imple-
menting this policy.369 These statutes abolished the collateral source rule
and allowed (and in some cases, mandated) courts to account for different
collateral source payments in determining the victim’s compensation.370
These statutes predominantly benefit the government and providers of
medical care.371
Courts also apply the public mechanism directly by imposing limits
on the collateral source rule. Consider a recent decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court, Stayton v. Delaware Health Corp.372 Ms. Diane Stayton was
seventy-six years old, wheelchair bound, and a resident of a healthcare
and rehabilitation center (HCRC).373 She was paralyzed in one of her
arms and one of her legs and had also suffered from a stroke.374 Despite
this condition, Stayton attempted to light a cigarette while unsuper-
vised.375 She did so unsuccessfully, caught her clothing on fire, and
sustained severe burns.376 Over thirty physicians and other healthcare
providers treated Stayton during her nearly six-month stay at a special
burn-treatment facility.377 This treatment was successful and, understan-
363. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 380, at 1058–59.
364. See id. at 1059–61.
365. Id. at 1058–59.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (explain-
ing the collateral source rule).
369. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 380, at 1059–61.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. 117 A.3d 521 (Del. 2015).
373. Id. at 523.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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dably, costly as well: Its sticker price was $3,683,797.11.378 Luckily for
Stayton, she was entitled to Medicare—a federal health insurance for
people who have reached the age of sixty-five and are eligible for Social
Security retirement benefits.379 Pursuant to the Medicare rules, Stayton’s
medical bill was written off by 93%.380 The burn-treatment facility billed
Medicare for only $262,550.17.381
Stayton sued HCRC in connection with the burning accident,
alleging, quite properly, negligent supervision.382 She demanded that
HCRC pay her $3,683,797.11 in economic damages and argued that
HCRC should not benefit from the Medicare write-off.383 According to
her, the collateral source rule did not allow wrongdoers to benefit from
such deductions.384
The court decided that Stayton’s medical expense damages amounted
to $262,550.17.385 The court ruled that the sum of $3,421,246.94 that the
burn-treatment facility wrote off was paid by no one; rather, it was nego-
tiated down by Medicare, which took advantage of its bargaining power,
and for that reason the collateral source rule did not apply.386
This decision properly abandoned the private mechanism of acci-
dent regulation that obligates the wrongdoer to pay the victim the undis-
counted market-based amount of her economic damage. Because the
defendant’s activity produced public benefit (medical care), the court
was right to use the public mechanism in determining the amount of
compensation that the plaintiff should recover. This amount should not
discourage the provision of medical care to elderly patients (as would
have been the case if the court awarded the plaintiff $3,683,797.11). The
requisite amount, however, should also be large enough to motivate care
providers to deliver good treatment to their patients. As the court
expressly acknowledged, “poor and disabled persons covered by govern-
ment programs will [now] receive the lowest recovery in litigation.”387
This recognition of a shortfall in deterrence gives reason for imposing
punitive damages, but Stayton did not ask the court to impose such
damages on HCRC.388 As a result, the deterrence issue remains unsettled.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 523–24.
380. Id. at 523.
381. Id. at 522–23.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 526.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 534.
386. Id. at 530–34.
387. Id. at 532.
388. Id. at 526 (listing Stayton’s arguments).
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V. DOCTRINALMIGRATIONS
This Part identifies and explains yet another important dynamic that
shapes the contours of our tort system: doctrinal migration. This term
refers to the complete or partial removal of accidents from the tort
system to other regulatory regimes and, conversely, to the expansion of
tort liability to mutually wanted and coercive interactions that fall under
the purview of contract law and criminal law. This dynamic includes the
imposition of tort liability as a principal penalty for intentional wrong-
doings, the emergence and development of the “public policy” doctrine
that voids contractual limitations on tort liability, the relocation of
workplace accidents from tort law into labor law, the derivation of medi-
cal malpractice rules from health law, and finally the merger between
products liability, federal regulation, and consumer protection.
The doctrinal migrations underscore the centrality of public interest.
Whether a potentially harmful interaction between individuals will give
rise to tort liability or, alternatively, will be governed by contract, crimi-
nal, or regulatory laws depends on the public interest in that interaction.
Rises and declines in the public interest trigger substitutions between
these behavior-controlling frameworks. Section V.A provides the theore-
tical basis for the doctrinal migration phenomenon, and section V.B
illustrates it.
A. Theory
Finding the right balance between victims’ safety, actors’ freedom,
and society’s welfare is a herculean task. Policymakers usually do not have
enough information for striking that balance and for setting up detailed
rules that could tell actors and prospective victims how to minimize risks
of accident.389 For that reason, our tort system uses general formulations
of negligence, causation, and damage that courts can apply on a case-by-
case basis.390
Shortage of information, however, is not the universal condition of
our government. Sometimes the government amasses enough informa-
tion about accidents and precautions to formulate detailed rules for
actors capable of causing an accident.391 The government does so in rela-
tion to accidents that are either recurrent or particularly severe—factors
389. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Fairy Tales, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 371, 371 (2007)
(describing as a fairy tale “the Great Society” in which “government officials are well-
informed, well-motivated, and very wise”).
390. For choices of different regulation formats, such as rules and standards, see
Parchomovsky & Stein, Catalogs, supra note 137, at 166–72.
391. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 493 (observing “regu-
latory agencies are specialized and have more flexible means of obtaining information”).
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increasing the public interest in setting up detailed regulation.392 The
distinction drawn earlier in this Article between different accident-prone
activities—those that generate strictly private benefits and those that
additionally produce public benefits—plays an important role here as
well.393 Activities that generate private benefits for the actor while being
capable of causing recurrent or severe accidents do not call for detailed
regulation. The government should flatly prohibit those activities and
accompany their prohibition with severe administrative penalties and
possibly with criminal penalties as well. Detailed regulation is needed
only for accident-prone activities that produce public benefits. This
distinction explains the government’s detailed regulation of socially
beneficial activities as multifaceted and diverse as medical care; construc-
tion works; manufacture of cars, firearms, and medical drugs and devices;
and operation of electricity grids and nuclear plants.394
The phenomenon of doctrinal migration occurs when government
regulation becomes more detailed and more comprehensive. When the
government’s regulatory provisions do no more than separate wrong-
doings or negligence from adequate care, the resulting migration will be
only partial: The tort system and regulatory law will then be operating in
tandem.395 When the regulation determines negligence and causation,
the migration of the relevant category of accidents into regulatory law
will be nearly complete. When the regulation determines negligence,
causation, and damage, the doctrinal migration will be accomplished:
The relevant accident category will then be relocated completely from
the law of torts into regulatory law.
Doctrinal migration also occurs outside the core area of the tort
system occupied by accidents. Specifically, it takes place on the system’s
borders that separate the domain of torts from those of contracts and
crimes. The contract–tort interface is occupied by rules regulating agree-
ments that determine the actor’s level of care and the victim’s consent to
a risk of accident. Such privatization of safety standards may run against
392. For analyses of common law versus administrative regulation of risks of accident,
see id. at 491–95 (weighing pros and cons of the two systems of risk regulation); Gillette &
Krier, supra note 103, at 1036–46 (same).
393. See supra Parts II–IV (analyzing the differences between private and public
mechanisms of accident regulation).
394. For a survey and economic analysis of some of these regulatory areas, see Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 19, at 503–27.
395. The Atomic Energy Damages (Price-Anderson) Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(2012), illustrates such migration. The Act sets up a complex regulatory mechanism for
nuclear accidents that combines tort liability with a pooled compensation fund, insurance,
and limits on compensation. See id. §§ 2210(a)–(b) (describing insurance requirements);
id. § 2210(e) (setting a limit on aggregate liability and establishing that Congress may
appropriate funds to cover damage beyond the limit). See generally Dan M. Berkovitz,
Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?—The Sixty-Three Million Dollar
Question, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (reviewing the history of the Act).
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public interest, an event that triggers the contract–tort migration: Tort
liability rules that normally regulate mutually unwanted interactions will
override the parties’ agreement.396
The crime–tort interface accommodates rules of tort liability that
apply to coercive interactions generally qualifying as crimes. Some of these
tortious interactions—assault, battery, and false imprisonment, to name
just a few—are also punishable as crimes.397 Other interactions (e.g.,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and employment
discrimination) are considered not harmful enough to justify the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties.398 The government consequently privatizes law
enforcement by granting the victim the power to sue the actor for com-
pensatory damages and, in appropriate cases, for punitive damages as
well.399 By doing so, it relocates the regulation of the underlying activities
from criminal law to the law of torts.400
Whether crimes and contracts will migrate into the domain of torts
critically depends on the level of public interest in the underlying inter-
actions, coercive and mutually wanted. High-level public interest will
account for the migration of contracts into the domain of torts. A low
level of public interest, on the other hand, will explain the migration of
crimes into the torts area. The same reasoning explains the migration of
accidents that normally constitute torts into the domains of criminal law
and contract. A high level of public interest might make an accident a
criminal offense. Conversely, a low level of public interest will often allow
actors and potential victims to contract away the actor’s liability for an
anticipated accident.401
Table 5 summarizes the doctrinal migrations affecting our tort system.
396. See infra section V.B (illustrating the migration dynamic by the rules that dilute
the assumption of risk defenses and invalidate agreements to lower the level of care and
release actors from liability for personal injuries).
397. For overlaps between torts and crimes, see Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243,
§ 2, at 4–5; Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 2, at 7–9.
398. See generally Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 607 (2015) (describing the mainline doctrine that does not criminalize
indignity and verbal harassment alongside statutory reforms that impose criminal penalties
for malicious inflictions of emotional distress). For thoughtful criticism of the government’s
failure to criminalize discriminatory practices that target race and gender, see Julie Chi-
hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 Am.
J. Comp. L. 295, 330–35 (2007) (criticizing courts’ and lawmakers’ emphasis on infliction
of material harm as a prerequisite for criminalization).
399. Cf. Stein, Two Wrongs, supra note 74, at 1219–20 (rationalizing tort victims’ right
to file suits by their superior knowledge and motivation).
400. See infra section V.B.2 (illustrating this doctrinal migration).
401. See infra section V.B.2 (outlining such examples in positive law).
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TABLE 5: DOCTRINALMIGRATIONS
To
Torts Contracts Criminal Law Regulatory Law
From
Torts Low level of
public interest
High level of
public interest
High level of
public interest
Contracts High level of
public interest
Criminal
Law
Low level of
public interest
B. Illustrations
1. Movements from Torts to Regulatory Law. — Medical malpractice and
workers’ compensation systems are the most salient, as well as the most
significant, illustrations of a switch from the traditional tort regime to
regulatory law.402 Another good example is the synergy between products
liability, federal regulation, and consumer protection.403 These dynamics,
outlined in this section, are driven by the special public interest in
medical care and in the protection of workers’ and consumers’ welfare.
Begin with medical malpractice. As of the last quarter of the pre-
vious century, this system of liability had undergone a series of statutory
reforms that merged it with health law.404 Chief among those reforms was
a wholesale redesign of the court-dependent negligence standard into a
catalog of specialized rules of medical care.405 Under extant law, whether
a doctor commits malpractice does not depend on vague notions of
“adequate care” or “good practice,” as it did in the past.406 Rather, it de-
pends on whether the doctor treated the patient in accordance with the
specific rules, practices, and protocols established by the medical profes-
402. Another example of migration is the establishment of a special no-fault compen-
sation program for vaccine-related injuries pursuant to the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (2012). See Lauren L. Haertlein, Immunizing
Against Bad Science: The Vaccine Court and the Autism Test Cases, 75 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 211, 213–17 (2012) (outlining the Vaccine Court’s procedures and decisions that
impose no-fault liability for injuries caused by vaccines and rely on in-table presumptions
of causation).
403. See infra notes 463–468 and accompanying text (describing how consumer
protection law fills gaps left by products liability law).
404. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1249–57 (surveying
and analyzing medical malpractice reforms).
405. See id. at 1249.
406. See id.
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sion.407 These rules, practices, and protocols embody the profession’s
calculation of the relevant risks and benefits.408
To identify the controlling professional standards, courts conse-
quently must rely on expert witnesses.409 These witnesses must practice
medicine in the same specialty area as the defendant doctor.410 Many
states also require that an expert’s statement—identifying the requisite
rule, practice, or protocol and the defendant’s deviation therefrom—be
submitted to court with the filing of the lawsuit or shortly thereafter.411 As
a result, subject to a few exceptions, courts no longer have the power to
determine medical-care standards by themselves.412 Our medical mal-
practice laws have delegated most of this power to the medical profes-
sion.413 What constitutes optimal medical care is a matter of doctors’
collective decisions. As a result of this reform, doctors who treat patients
according to their specialty’s internal rules and protocols have less fear of
malpractice liability.414 Their incentive to resort to defensive medicine
consequently becomes smaller415 and the premiums they pay for liability
insurance arguably get smaller as well.416
The regulatory reforms in that area have affected remedies as well.
Many states have enacted statutes capping compensation for medical
407. See id. at 1236–39.
408. See id.
409. See id. 1238–40, 1252.
410. For recent court decisions that strictly apply the “same specialty” requirement,
see Smith v. Fisher, 143 So. 3d 110, 120–25 (Ala. 2013) (disqualifying a board-certified
internal medicine specialist as a witness against a neurosurgeon); Baker v. Univ. Physicians
Healthcare, 296 P.3d 42, 46–50 (Ariz. 2013) (disqualifying a board-certified physician
specializing in internal medicine, hematology, and oncology as a witness against a board-
certified pediatric hematologist-oncologist); Hankla v. Postell, 749 S.E.2d 726, 728–30 (Ga.
2013) (disqualifying a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist who handled over
1,000 deliveries as a witness to describe midwife malpractice). But see Wilkins v. Conn.
Childbirth & Women’s Ctr., 104 A.3d 671, 679–81 (Conn. 2014) (holding 4–3 that a board-
certified obstetrician and gynecologist was eligible to testify in a suit attributing malprac-
tice to a midwife).
411. See Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform:
The Erie Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 217, 222–25 (2010) (surveying certificate-of-merit requirements for medical malpractice
suits).
412. See, e.g., Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1228–32 (des-
cribing exceptional cases relating to mismanagement of medical resources and personnel in
which courts determined the medical-care standards by themselves).
413. See id. at 1203–05.
414. See id. at 1207–08, 1216 (explaining doctors can avoid malpractice by simply
going by the book).
415. See id.
416. The argument on premiums, however, is empirically debatable. See Ronen
Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health Insurance
Coverage, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 319, 320 (2010).
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malpractice victims.417 These statutes predominantly capped compensa-
tion for pain, suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and all
other noneconomic damages.418 Only a few of them capped economic
damages as well.419 Caps set by these statutes vary from one jurisdiction to
another. Back in 1975, the California legislature set the maximal recovery
amount for noneconomic damages at $250,000,420 and a recent refer-
endum refused to update this sum.421 More generous caps were set at
$1,500,000.422 Plaintiffs’ attorneys have challenged the caps on consti-
tutional grounds with varying success.423 Recently, however, the Florida
Supreme Court issued an important decision that voided Florida’s
$1,000,000 cap on noneconomic damages, recoverable for wrongful
death caused by medical malpractice, after finding that the government
had no rational reason for discriminating against victims of medical mal-
practice relative to other tort victims.424
Regulatory reforms driven by public interest have also put in place a
special health law remedy for medical malpractice. The Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) set up the National
Practitioner Data Bank, which collects information about malpractice-
related verdicts, settlements, penalties, and payments of compensation.425
To facilitate the Bank’s operation, the HCQIA imposes expansive report-
ing duties on both public and private actors that investigate, adjudicate,
and settle medical malpractice complaints.426 Critically, the HCQIA also
lays down an irrebuttable presumption that attributes to hospitals and
other medical care organizations full knowledge of their doctors’ mal-
practice records.427 This presumption exposes corporate providers of
medical care to tort liability for negligent hiring and credentialing of
physicians.428 As a consequence, hospitals and other medical care organi-
zations have a strong incentive not to hire or contract with doctors with a
malpractice record. Doctors, in turn, have a strong incentive to avoid
medical malpractice.
417. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1253–54.
418. Id. at 1253.
419. Id.
420. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2(b) (West 2016).
421. See California Proposition 46, Medical Malpractice Lawsuit Cap and Drug Testing
of Doctors (2014), Ballotpedia, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_46,_Medi
cal_Malpractice_Lawsuits_Cap_and_Drug_Testing_of_Doctors_(2014) [http://perma.cc/
U7GV-LHRD] (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (reporting the defeat of legislative reform to
increase the damage cap to over $1,000,000).
422. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1253.
423. Id. at 1253–54.
424. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 905–12 (Fla. 2014).
425. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11134 (2012).
426. Id.
427. Id. § 11135(b).
428. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1232.
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By specializing the physicians’ duty of care, the regulatory reforms
have reshaped the doctrine of causation as well. As an actor’s duty of care
defines the scope of the risk that falls under her responsibility,429 for
doctors, the scope of the risk includes all medical information pertaining
to the pros and cons of the available treatments and their effects on the
patient. As a result, doctors managing a patient’s pain might find them-
selves responsible for the patient’s death when the pain becomes unbea-
rable and the patient develops depression and commits suicide.430 Courts
also have utilized medical statistics to establish the “lost chance” doctrine
that entitles a patient to recover compensation from a doctor who did
not treat her properly, even when the patient is unable to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her injury resulted from the doctor’s
malpractice.431 Under the “lost chance” doctrine, the patient needs to
prove only that the doctor’s malpractice might have worsened, or might
have failed to improve, her medical condition.432 The doctor will then
have to compensate the patient for her lost chance: the probability of the
counterfactual scenario in which the patient recovers from her illness
after receiving adequate treatment.433 To calculate the patient’s compen-
sation, the court must multiply this probability by the full amount of the
patient’s damage.434 This doctrine does not allow malpractitioners to seek
refuge in the patient’s preexisting condition.435
The second migration example comes from the workers’ compen-
sation statutes that relocated workplace accidents from the law of torts to
labor law.436 This relocation started in 1908, was nearly complete by
1921,437 and was even more salient and more comprehensive than the mi-
gration of medical malpractice into health law. Between 1908 and 1921,
most states enacted workers’ compensation statutes that proceeded on
the theory that “the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman.”438 Under these statutes, employers bear the financial burden
associated with their employees’ work-related injuries. To relieve them-
selves from that burden, employers purchase compulsory liability insu-
429. See supra notes 330–331 and accompanying text (illustrating the nexus between
an actor’s duty of care and the scope of liability for resulting harm).
430. See, e.g., Ga. Clinic v. Stout, 747 S.E.2d 83, 88–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
431. See supra note 133 (citing cases that allowed proof of causation by reduced
chances of recovery).
432. Porat & Stein, Indeterminate Causation, supra note 133, at 679–82 (analyzing
decisions that imposed liability for lost chances to recover).
433. Id.
434. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 133 (awarding victims fractional probability-
based compensation).
435. See Stein, Theory of Medical Malpractice, supra note 189, at 1225–26.
436. These statutes are analyzed in Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 80, at 572–80.
437. Id. at 573.
438. Id.
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rance and shift the cost of the insurance to consumers who buy their
products.439
The workers’ compensation statutes hold employers strictly liable for
their employees’ work-related injuries and illnesses.440 An injured emplo-
yee’s compensation entitlement consequently does not depend on her
employer’s fault, nor does it require strong evidence of causation.441 The
statutes also do not allow the employer to reduce its compensation duty
by invoking contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or the “fellow
servant” defense that shifts the employer’s responsibility for the emplo-
yee’s injury to a coworker.442 Most of the workers’ compensation statutes,
however, limit the compensation amounts that injured employees can
recover.443 This scheme of employers’ labor law obligations supplants the
core concepts of negligence, causation, and damage.444
The Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), as interpreted by
courts, follows a similar modus operandi.445 As a formal matter, FELA
conditions an employee’s entitlement to compensation on the presence
of negligence on the part of her federal employer. Courts, however, have
interpreted this condition in a way that allows the employee to prevail
with minimal proof of negligence.446 Courts also have lowered the emplo-
yee’s burden of proving causation.447 To recover compensation from her
federal employer, an employee needs only to establish some causal con-
nection between her illness or injury and her job.448 She need not satisfy
the rigid but-for standard set by the private mechanism of accident regu-
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 574.
444. See Orin Kramer & Richard Briffault, Workers Compensation: Strengthening the
Social Compact 1–2 (1991) (stating that statutory workers’ compensation schemes grew
out of the inadequacies of tort law).
445. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012). FELA remedies are also available to seamen suing the
United States pursuant to the Jones Act of 1915 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. See
Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 80, at 580.
446. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 80, at 578–79; see also Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (holding even slight evidence of negligence gets an employee’s
suit to a jury); Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 820 (7th Cir. 1985) (same);
Mendoza v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 733 F.2d 631, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Heater v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1243, 1246–47 (7th Cir. 1974) (same).
447. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 695–71 (2011) (noting FELA has
relaxed the common law causation requirement).
448. Id. at 705 (holding a FELA defendant assumes liability “if [its] negligence played
a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Seventh Circuit Jury Instructions (Joint Appendix at 31a, CSX Transp.,
564 U.S. 685 (No. 10-235)))).
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lation.449 Nor is she required to furnish evidence that meets the public
mechanism’s “substantial factor” requirement.450 Any contribution by an
unsafe workplace condition to the employee’s injury will suffice, no
matter how small it was.451
Moreover, the Supreme Court also has allowed railroad employees
who contracted asbestosis at their work to recover compensation for their
future chances to develop mesothelioma.452 The Court affirmed that
award in the form of compensation for the employees’ fear of developing
that fatal cancer.453 Similar to state workers’ compensation legislation,
FELA also does not allow the employer to rely on the assumption of risk
and the causality-based defenses (including the fellow-servant rule).454
Under this framework, worker rights originating from labor law push
aside the system of torts.
The third and last illustration is the synergy between products
liability, federal safety regulation, and consumer protection statutes.
Under the U.S. torts system, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of
defective products bear strict liability for accidental damages caused by
those products.455 This liability is not fault free. Defendants in products
liability actions can be held liable only upon a showing that the product
in question has a defect in its design, manufacture, or accompanying
information about hazards.456 Such defects originate from some mistake,
omission, or breach of an express or implied warranty—misconducts that
often constitute negligence as well.457 Products liability rules can conse-
quently be viewed as creating an irrebuttable presumption of negligence
against manufacturers and suppliers of defective products.458 These rules
interact with two important regulatory frameworks: federal regulation
and consumer protection.
449. See id. (interpreting the causation test prescribed by FELA as satisfied so long as
defendant’s negligence “played a part” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rogers,
352 U.S. at 503)).
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayres, 538 U.S. 135, 152–59 (2003).
453. Id.
454. See Keeton et al., supra note 8, § 80, at 573.
455. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 352, at 970–72.
456. Id. §§ 354–355, at 977–81.
457. Id. § 354, at 979 (noting design and warning defects claims are increasingly
decided using negligence principles while manufacturing defects claims are dealt with
under strict liability).
458. See, e.g., Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976) (“[P]roof of
a defect rendering a product unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault on
the part of the seller to impose liability without placing an often impossible burden on the
plaintiff of proving specific acts of negligence.” (citing McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154
N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967); Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Wis. 1967))).
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Lawmakers set these interactions in motion to promote two different
public interests. Federal regulation of products such as cars and medical
devices creates standardization and economies of scale.459 Furthermore,
the absence of uniform federal standards exposes manufacturers to the
prospect of excessive products liability under state laws.460 Manufacturers
facing this prospect increase their products’ prices without making those
products safer than before.461 By stepping in to preclude states from
modifying its uniform safety requirements, federal regulation prevents
this race to the bottom.462
Consumer protection laws interacting with the rules of products
liability perform a different regulatory role. They compensate for the tort
system’s unwillingness to recognize pure economic losses as compensable
damage.463 This unwillingness stems from the fact that pure economic
losses—for example, transactional overpayments and loss of sales—do
not reduce society’s welfare but merely change its distribution among
individuals and firms.464 For that reason, there is little public interest in
regulating such losses save for some exceptional cases.465 Consumer
protection is one of those cases. There is strong public interest in pre-
venting firms from taking advantage of their superior information and
bargaining power in order to force consumers into transactions that do
not give them fair value for their money.466 This interest is also at play in
the case of misleading product warnings that compromise the safety—
and hence the value—of consumer products. Such warnings are the same
as false advertising or a deceptive trade practice that violates consumer
459. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and
the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1603 (2007) (“The more rigid the
product mandate, especially for products with a large market, the greater the justification
for a single rule that provides certainty, economies of scale, and avoidance of market
balkanization.”).
460. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1370–72, 1386–89 (2006).
461. Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 17 (2000) (arguing uniformity reduces
costs and coordinated regulation contributes to increased product safety as a whole).
462. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 460, at 1386–89; see also Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1283, 1284 (1997) (making
a similar point to underscore environmental regulation advantages).
463. See, e.g., Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d
1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001) (holding pure economic damage is not actionable in tort).
464. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 4–6 (1982).
465. See Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 23 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4–7 (1994) (discussing the “fishermen rule” and its economic
rationale).
466. See Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
19–23 (1979).
2017] THE DOMAIN OF TORTS 609
protection statutes.467 Those statutes consequently function as substitutes
for products liability.468
2. Migrations Between Torts, Contract Law, and Criminal Law. — As a
historical matter, the torts of battery, assault, and false imprisonment
originate from crimes.469 They remain criminal behaviors today as well,470
but their severity varies from one case to another and does not always
trigger criminal charges. Whether a person will be criminally prosecuted
for battery, assault, or false imprisonment depends on the public interest
in the prosecution.471 When this interest is low or not present, the
government will not file criminal charges against the actor. Tort compen-
sation consequently becomes the victim’s only recourse.472
Many intentional inflictions of harm on another person are not
considered criminal. The general assumption about such behaviors holds
that the public interest in suppressing them is not strong enough to
justify the government’s resort to criminal law.473 Examples of such
noncriminal behaviors include defamation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, deliberate disruption of another person’s business, and
employment discrimination. For deterring such behaviors and protecting
victims’ interests, tort liability will suffice.474 Lack of public interest in
criminal prosecutions thus turns those potentially criminal behaviors into
torts.
Move now to the domain of contracts. As a general matter, courts
operating in that domain do not examine the substance and social desi-
467. See, e.g., Am. Shooting Sports Council, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 904
(Mass. 1999) (authorizing the state attorney general, “in the interests of consumer protec-
tion, to regulate the sale of products that are unsafe or defective in ways that a purchaser
cannot foresee”).
468. For illustrations of the synergy between products liability and consumer protec-
tion statutes, see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 430–31 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (applying a consumer protection statute to drugs that have side effects); Pelman v.
McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying a consumer
protection statute to obesity inducing food), vacated in part, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005).
469. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 2, at 4.
470. See Model Penal Code §§ 211.1, 212.3 (Am. Law Inst. 1985).
471. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 983 (2009) (noting prosecutors should promote
public interest but whether they align with this ideal is unclear).
472. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[O]ne function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures on an overloaded
system of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor
crimes.”).
473. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and
Normative Perspectives, 17 Widener L.J. 719, 719–20 (2008) (explaining state interest in
the prosecution of offenders is a core factor separating crimes from torts).
474. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 Minn. L.
Rev. 9, 30–40 (2010) (proposing strategic use of tort remedies for deterring employment
discrimination).
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rability of parties’ undertakings.475 Instead, they apply the bargain prin-
ciple that obligates parties to abide by their mutual promises.476 However,
contracts that reduce a party’s obligation to prevent accidental harm to
another party often become a matter of public concern.477 This observa-
tion holds true of all contracts regulating the supply of goods and services
that are important for society. Those goods and services range from
recreational activities such as skiing to delivery of vital medical care.478
Contractual stipulations and waivers that allow providers of such goods
and services to deviate from the requisite safety standards run against
public interest.479 The legal system consequently voids such stipulations
and waivers and brings tort liability into play.
CONCLUSION
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed ended their path-breaking
article on property and liability rules with an important—yet, oft-forgotten
—methodological caveat. They wrote:
Framework or model building has two shortcomings. The first is
that models can be mistaken for the total view of phenomena,
like legal relationships, which are too complex to be painted in
any one picture. The second is that models generate boxes into
which one then feels compelled to force situations which do not
truly fit.480
Top-down theories that portray our tort system as promoting optimal
deterrence, or alternatively corrective justice, as a single goal did not heed
this caveat. These theories consequently suffer from the twin vices of
475. See, e.g., Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 649 n.41 (Tex. 2007) (“As a
rule, a court should not by judicial fiat insert non-existent language . . . into parties’
agreed-to contracts . . . .”); see also Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and
Theory 23–26 (5th ed. 2013) (underscoring contracting parties’ autonomy as a basis for
liability under contract law).
476. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1982) (describing the role of the bargain principle in contract law).
477. See Dobbs, Law of Torts, supra note 243, § 213, at 542–43 (noting courts will
impose duties for public policy reasons).
478. See id. at 542–43 (describing public policy limits on consent and providing
examples); see also, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 741–44 (Conn.
2005) (invoking public policy to void a resort operator’s release from tort liability for a
snow tuber’s injuries).
479. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963)
(voiding an advance release from medical malpractice liability on public policy grounds);
Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (same), aff’d, 282
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); see also Reardon v. Windswept Farm, L.L.C., 905 A.2d 1156, 1161–
63 (Conn. 2006) (voiding releases of operator liability for horseback riding).
480. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1127–28 (1972).
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oversimplification and superimposition that Calabresi and Melamed
warned about.
This Article’s positive theory of the law of torts works its way bottom-
up. It identifies the essential features that separate torts from contracts,
on the one hand, and crimes, on the other, and then develops a coherent
and comprehensive account of our tort system that best fits case law and
statutory law. This account reveals that our tort system operates in two
modes. In some cases, it promotes fairness and corrective justice; in
others, it sets up incentives for minimizing the total cost of accidents and
accident avoidance.
The system’s choice between these two modes depends on the
benefit generated by the underlying accident-prone activity. When the
benefit from the activity is purely private, the system applies rules that
promote fairness and corrective justice. These rules treat individuals as
equal members of a civilized community founded upon reciprocity and
mutual respect by refusing to prioritize one person’s private benefit, no
matter how large it is, over another person’s safety interest. When the
benefit arising from the accident-prone activity is public, however, the
system switches to an efficiency mode and applies rules that minimize the
overall cost of accidents. These rules allow actors who produce public
benefits to expose other people to a risk of harm when the value of the
benefit exceeds the expected harm to the victim. Because the victim
enjoys, or is presumed to enjoy, the public benefit generated by the risky
activity, the system gives her no entitlement to enjoin or raise the cost of
the benefit’s production at the community’s expense. This bi-modal
operation of our tort system accounts for the existing variations in the
doctrines of negligence, causation, and damage.
This bottom-up account of tort law makes two principal contribu-
tions. First and most important, it offers a comprehensive descriptive
account of how our tort system works by analyzing the system’s scope and
interplay with other branches of the law and by uncovering important
dynamics that animate the doctrines of negligence, causation, and
damage. Second, it identifies the virtues of the bi-modal regulation of
accidents that interchangeably promotes welfare and corrective justice
and redefines the criteria for evaluating the advantages and the short-
comings of our system of torts.
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